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America on Fire: Climate Change, 
Wildfires & Insuring Natural 
Catastrophes 
Christopher C. French∗ 
America is on fire. The damage, destruction, and loss of life caused by 
wildfires have exploded over the past few decades. Nine of the ten worst fire 
seasons have occurred in the past fifteen years, with 2017 and 2018 being 
the worst years ever. Despite spending approximately $3.7 billion annually 
on fire suppression, more than 35,000 structures were lost to wildfires in 
2017 and 2018, approximately $32 billion in property losses occurred, and 
more than 100 people were killed. More than forty million homes worth 
approximately $187 billion in the U.S. are currently at a high risk of 
destruction due to wildfires. In response to this crisis, the insurance industry 
has been dropping customers and refusing to insure homes that are 
considered at high risk for wildfires, while also excluding coverage under 
homeowners policies for other natural catastrophes such as floods and earth 
movement. As a result, natural catastrophes are largely uninsured in 
America today. 
This Article discusses the causes of the wildfire crisis, including climate 
change, and ways to mitigate the crisis. It also analyzes the current 
insurance market for wildfires and other natural catastrophes in America. 
In doing so, it explores how other developed countries, such as Australia, 
Belgium, France, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland, insure 
natural catastrophes. It concludes by seeking to transform the insurance 
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market in America for natural catastrophes by proposing the creation of a 
governmental insurance program that “bundles” coverages for natural 
catastrophes together in a single policy. Bundling the coverages would solve 
the correlated risk, adverse selection, and moral hazard problems that have 
driven private insurers from the insurance market for natural catastrophes 
and plague insurance programs that cover only a single catastrophic peril, 
such as the National Flood Insurance Program. 
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INTRODUCTION 
America is on fire. The damage, destruction, and loss of life caused by 
wildfires have exploded over the past few decades. Nine of the ten worst 
fire seasons have occurred in the past fifteen years with 2017 and 2018 
being the worst years ever.1 Despite spending approximately $3.7 
billion annually on fire suppression, more than 35,000 structures were 
lost to wildfires in 2017 and 2018, approximately $32 billion in 
property losses occurred and more than 100 people were killed.2 Over 
nine million acres of land burned in 2017 alone.3 Experts estimate that 
more than forty million homes in the U.S., worth approximately $187 
 
 1 See Leigh Barton, Note, Let It Burn: An Argument for an Adaptive Resilience 
Approach to Federal Wildfire Management in the Western United States, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 695, 697 (2018); see also WILDFIRES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY 
FUTURE, A REPORT FROM GOVERNOR NEWSOM’S STRIKE FORCE 1 (2019), 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Wildfires-and-Climate-Change-
California%E2%80%99s-Energy-Future.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM9C-MC2V] 
[hereinafter STRIKE FORCE REPORT] (“Fifteen of the 20 most destructive wildfires in the 
state’s history have occurred since 2000; ten of the most destructive fires have occurred 
since 2015.”). 
 2 See STEPHEN L. QUARLES & KELLY POHL, HEADWATERS ECON., BUILDING A WILDFIRE-
RESISTANT HOME: CODES AND COSTS 7 (2018), https://headwaterseconomics.org/wp-
content/uploads/building-costs-codes-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F25-YCXM]; AM. PROP. 
CAS. INS. ASS’N, THE RISK OF WILDFIRES IS GROWING 2 (2019), http://www.pciaa.net/ 
docs/default-source/industry-issues/8_wildfires.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG4W-5SLQ]; STRIKE 
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5; Katherine Blunt & Russell Gold, PG&E Delayed Safety 
Work on Power Line that Is Prime Suspect in California Wildfire, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2019, 
1:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-delayed-safety-work-on-power-line-that-
is-prime-suspect-in-california-wildfire-11551292977 [https://perma.cc/KKZ5-KT4T] 
[hereinafter PG&E Delayed Safety Work]; Russell Gold & Katherine Blunt, Wildfires Drove 
PG&E to Bankruptcy, Where Utility Must Change to Survive, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2019, 7:11 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wildfires-drove-pg-e-to-bankruptcy-where-utility-must-
change-to-survive-11548807084 [https://perma.cc/JQ6L-MR95] [hereinafter Wildfires Drove 
PG&E to Bankruptcy]; Mary W. Walsh, How Wildfires Are Making Some California Homes 
Uninsurable, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/business/ 
california-fires-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/YL8T-33JN]; Facts + Statistics: Wildfires, 
INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-wildfires (last visited Sept. 2, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/XL6L-TH4L]. 
 3 See Paige Blankenbuehler & Brooke Warren, Why Western Wildfires Are Getting 
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billion, are currently at high risk of loss due to wildfires.4 Those figures 
do not even include the loss of business and tax revenues caused by 
wildfires. Nor do they consider the costs associated with the diminished 
air quality that accompanies wildfires.5 
The insurance industry’s response to the wildfire crisis has been to 
refuse to renew policies for homeowners who are at high risk for 
wildfire losses and to refuse to sell policies to new customers who are 
at high risk.6 The number of homeowners being dropped by their 
insurers has reached “tens of thousands of homeowners across the state 
[of California], and regulators expect more nonrenewals in the coming 
months.”7 Insurers already exclude coverage in homeowners policies 
for other natural catastrophes such as floods, earthquakes, and 
landslides.8 By adding wildfires to the list of natural catastrophes that 
 
 4 See Sarah Kaplan & Frances Stead Sellers, How They Survived: Owners of the Few 
Homes Left Standing Around Paradise, Calif., Took Critical Steps to Ward off Wildfires, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 30, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/how-they-
survived-owners-of-the-few-homes-left-standing-around-paradise-calif-took-critical-steps-
to-ward-off-wildfires/2018/11/30/db323782-f34b-11e8-80d0-f7e1948d55f4_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/LR2D-G2VZ]; Facts + Statistics: Wildfires, supra note 2. 
 5 See STRIKE FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
 6 See Christopher Flavelle, As Wildfires Get Worse, Insurers Pull Back from Riskiest 
Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/climate/fire-
insurance-renewal.html [https://perma.cc/M8WF-4F8A] (“Insurers are quietly 
reducing their exposure to fire-prone regions across the Western United States . . . .”); 
Nicole Friedman, California Homeowners Face Higher Prices for a Scarce Commodity: 
Wildfire Insurance, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/california-homeowners-face-higher-prices-for-a-scarce-commodity-wildfire-
insurance-11549803600 [https://perma.cc/JRJ6-SP4H] [hereinafter Wildfire Insurance] 
(noting insurers are refusing to sell insurance to some homeowners or asking for 
substantial premium rate increases); Thomas Fuller & Ivan Penn, California, Wary of 
More Wildfires, Is Paying for Them Already, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/us/california-wildfires-costs.html [https://perma. 
cc/8TAT-Y5HE] (noting that a homeowner whose house was near a recent wildfire area 
was dropped by his insurer and other “insurance companies want five times the $1,800 
a year he currently pays”); Walsh, supra note 2 (“[S]ome [insurers] . . . have been 
declining to renew homeowners’ policies in fire-prone areas.”). 
 7 Nicole Friedman, High Cost of Wildfire Insurance Hurts California Home Sales, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/high-cost-of-wildfire-
insurance-hurts-california-home-sales-11578220200 [https://perma.cc/7ULH-CT85] 
[hereinafter High Cost]. 
 8 See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Lawrence, 35 U.S. 507, 518 (1836) 
(noting the exclusion of coverage for earthquakes under a fire policy); Peters Twp. Sch. 
Dist. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 833 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he reason 
for the insertion of the exclusionary clause . . . in all risk insurance policies is to relieve 
the insurer from occasional major disasters which are almost impossible to predict and 
thus to insure against. There are earthquakes or floods which cause a major catastrophe 
and wreak damage to everyone in a large area rather than on individual policyholder.” 
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private insurers refuse to insure, many types of natural catastrophes 
losses are simply uninsured in America. In fact, Americans suffered 
approximately $33 billion in uninsured natural catastrophe losses in 
2018.9 
Much of the legal scholarship regarding the relationship between 
climate change and insurance has focused on using insurance to 
influence policyholders’ behavior to act to promote climate mitigation 
or adaptation on their insured properties rather than addressing the lack 
of insurance to cover natural catastrophe losses caused, in part, by 
climate change.10 This Article embraces many of the arguments made in 
the existing scholarship regarding behavior modification, but it also 
proposes a new approach to insuring natural catastrophes in America at 
a time when the damage caused by natural catastrophes is dramatically 
increasing.  
Specifically, this Article proposes that coverage for natural 
catastrophe perils, including wildfires, floods, landslides and 
hurricanes, be “bundled” together in a single property insurance policy 
sold by the government.11 Such a program would provide a solution to 
 
(quoting Wyatt v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 781, 782-83 (D. Minn. 1969))); 
Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 162-63 (2011) (“Earth movement 
exclusions were historically included in insurance policies to protect insurance 
companies from having to pay out on policies when a catastrophic event caused damage 
to numerous policyholders.”); Warren Kriesel & Craig Landry, Participation in the 
National Flood Insurance Program: An Empirical Analysis for Coastal Properties, 71 J. RISK 
& INS. 405, 405 (2004) (discussing how insurers have historically not provided 
insurance for floods); Brian Mattis, Earth Movement Claims Under All Risk Insurance: The 
Rules Have Changed in California, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 29, 36 (1990) (citing State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co.’s Homeowners Policy Special Form 3, p. 7, Form FP-7103) 
(discussing the history behind earthquake insurance). 
 9 See Facts + Statistics: U.S. Catastrophes, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-
statistic/facts-statistics-us-catastrophes (last visited Sept. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
7RG6-5Q9G]. 
 10 See, e.g., Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance 
Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1585 (2008) (discussing how insurance can influence 
policyholders’ responses to climate change); Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. 
Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging 
Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1836-40 (2007) (suggesting that insurers 
can mitigate climate change injuries by providing incentives to change policyholders’ 
negative behaviors that are causing climate change). 
 11 Bundling insurance coverage for numerous risks together in a single insurance 
policy is not new. For example, the Commercial General Liability (formerly known as 
the Comprehensive General Liability) policy combines various liability coverages in a 
single policy and has been sold in America since the 1940s. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Rediscovering the Sawyer Solution: Bundling Risk for Protection and Profit, 11 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 170, 182-87 (2013) (explaining the reasoning behind the 
development of the CGL policy). 
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the problem of insuring natural catastrophes in America because it 
would address the correlated risk, adverse selection, and moral hazard 
problems associated with insuring natural catastrophes that have 
resulted in private insurers simply refusing to insure them. Indeed, as 
will be discussed in Part IV.E, many developed countries around the 
world already insure natural catastrophe losses through some type of 
governmental program. Bundling coverages for numerous types of 
natural catastrophe perils together in a single policy sold by the 
government would also solve the numerous problems that plague 
insurance programs that cover only a single catastrophic peril (e.g., 
flooding), such as the National Flood Insurance Program.  
So, what caused the wildfire crisis in America? The wildfire crisis was 
created, in part, by a federal governmental policy in place between 1905 
and the 1970s that treated all wildfires as bad and, thus, sought to 
suppress them as quickly as possible.12 The consequence of that policy 
was the accumulation of wildfire fuel in the form of excess trees, shrubs, 
and brush in forests across the country.13 Returning forests to their 
natural equilibrium will take time, but many of the ways to do it are 
 
 12 See, e.g., ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33990, FEDERAL FUNDING FOR 
WILDFIRE CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT 1 (2011) (discussing previous land management 
policy); STEPHEN J. PYNE, PATRICIA L. ANDREWS & RICHARD D. LAVEN, INTRODUCTION TO 
WILDLAND FIRE 248 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the history of forest management and 
wildfire suppression in America); Barton, supra note 1, at 698-99 (explaining how “U.S. 
federal wildfire management was founded on the belief that fast, aggressive control was 
the best, most effective management strategy”); Jamison E. Colburn, Retreat Alternatives 
in NEPA: A Tool for the Perplexed, 33 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 3, 6 (2018) [hereinafter Retreat 
Alternatives] (citing STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND 
AND RURAL FIRE 275-87 (1982)) (“For much of the twentieth century, the Forest Service 
and Department of Interior land managers implemented what was known as the 
‘10 A.M.’ policy: attacking any discovered wildfire on the lands they administer with the 
goal of extinguishing it by mid-morning the next day.”); Garrett D. Trego, We Didn’t 
Start the Fire . . . And We Won’t Pay to Stop It: Financing Wildfire Management in America’s 
Wildland-Urban Interface, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL L. & POL’Y REV. 595, 598-99 (2012) 
(discussing how the suppression policy was created “[o]ut of necessity and a sense of 
obligation and pride”). 
 13 See, e.g., Barton, supra note 1, at 698-99 (“[F]ire suppression activities had 
created a buildup of hazardous fuels and had changed the composition and arrangement 
of these fuels.”); Jamison Colburn, The Fire Next Time: Land Use Planning in the 
Wildland/Urban Interface, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 223, 225-26 (2008) 
[hereinafter Fire Next Time] (explaining how the longer fire is suppressed, “the more 
likely it will return with a vengeance”); Debra L. Donahue, Agriculture and Forestry, in 
THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 351, 390 
(Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012) (discussing the sources of 
wildfire fuels); Trego, supra note 12, at 599-602 (discussing how the fire suppression 
policy “created fuel buildup partially responsible for the recent increase in wildfire 
activity”). 
  
2020] America on Fire 823 
known. Controlled burns and the reduction of wildfire fuels from 
forests are two ways of doing so.14 The federal government has been 
attempting to implement both techniques for a few decades now, but 
most of its time and money until recently had been spent fighting fires 
instead of addressing the root causes of the fires.15 
Another cause of the wildfire crisis is climate change. Climate change 
has resulted in a longer and drier wildfire season.16 Addressing climate 
change is a worldwide collective action problem that will require a 
significant amount of time, effort, and worldwide cooperation.17 
Consequently, because climate change needs to be addressed on a 
worldwide basis, as a practical matter, that means that the solution to 
 
 14 See Kimiko Barrett, Reducing Wildfire Risk in the Wildland-Urban Interface: Policy, 
Trends, and Solutions, 55 IDAHO L. REV. 3, 6 (2019); Barton, supra note 1, at 711; Allan 
Kanner & Caitrin Reilly, Like a Phoenix Rising from the Ashes: Melding Wildfire Law into 
a Comprehensive Statute, 33 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 47, 60 (2018); Kathryn Young, Chapter 
638: Uniting to Fight Fire with Fire by Addressing California Forest Health in a Time of 
Catastrophic Wildfire, 50 U. PAC. L. REV 301, 305-07 (2019). 
 15 For example, in 2003, Congress passed the Healthy Forests Restoration Act 
(“HFRA”), which sought to restore the ecological benefits of wildfires by establishing 
programs of aggressive thinning, prescribed burning, and replanting to create open 
conditions in forests. See Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-48, 
§ 2, 117 Stat. 1887, 1888. In 2009, Congress enacted the Federal Land Assistance, 
Management and Enhancement Act (“FLAME”), which sought “[t]o safely and 
effectively extinguish fire, when needed; use fire where allowable; manage our natural 
resources; and as a Nation, live with wildland fire.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., Building a Cohesive Strategy, FORESTS & RANGELANDS, 
https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/strategy/building.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/Z6TD-A4V7]; see 43 U.S.C. § 1748b (2018); Brian Bona, The 
Wildfire Crisis: How the Federal Government Has Tried to Stop the Burn, 6 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 1081, 1084 (2016) (“The agencies cannot adequately minimize the wildfires 
using fuel reduction techniques because all their funds go to emergency firefighting. 
Since the agencies are unable to fully engage in preventative measures, the wildfires 
become increasingly worse in subsequent years, which drives up the cost of fighting the 
fires and forces the agencies to rely further on ‘fire-borrowing.’”). See generally U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra (describing the National Cohesive 
Wildland Fire Management Strategy that was designed “to allow for inclusiveness and 
understanding of the complexities of managing wildfire risks across the country”). 
 16 See, e.g., QUARLES & POHL, supra note 2, at 7 (describing how “the average wildfire 
season is nearly three months longer”); Barton, supra note 1, at 697 (noting how 
“climate change is only worsening the threat of wildfires”); Trego, supra note 12, at 602 
(noting “climate change in the United States has created longer fire seasons”). 
 17 See, e.g., Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime 
Failure, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 195, 196 (2007) (“Climate change is a collective action 
problem par excellence.”); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits 
of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 102 (2007) (“[L]ocal action is not well 
suited to regulating mobile global conduct yielding a global externality.”). 
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the immediate wildfire crisis in America cannot depend upon the effects 
of climate change being reversed in the short term. 
The third cause of the wildfire crisis is urban sprawl — the 
development of homes and neighborhoods on the edges of forests that 
are prone to wildfires.18 This phenomenon has been exacerbated by the 
fact that many of the homes located in wildfire areas were not built to 
resist wildfires.19 Addressing this aspect of the problem is within the 
power of Americans. Where and how people build can be regulated 
through zoning ordinances and building codes.20 
The fourth cause of the wildfire crisis, which is the focus of the 
primary scholarly contribution of this Article, is insurers’ recent refusal 
to insure homes at high risk for wildfire losses. Fire is and was the 
original peril that was covered by property insurance.21 Unlike other 
natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes and floods, fire losses 
traditionally have not been viewed as correlated risks, so insurers 
historically have covered them with little question. Correlated risks are 
perils that cause numerous losses in the same area at approximately the 
same time.22 Because many types of natural catastrophes are considered 
correlated risks, private insurers generally refuse to insure them. Private 
insurers avoid insuring correlated risks because of insurers’ alleged 
inability to accurately predict when and where losses associated with 
correlated risks will occur, which in turn makes it difficult to establish 
 
 18 See, e.g., QUARLES & POHL, supra note 2, at 1 (describing how communities are 
considering adopting new building codes due to wildfires and “the wildland-urban 
interface”); Faith Berry, Lucian Deaton & Michele Steinberg, Firewise: The Value of 
Voluntary Action and Standard Approaches to Reducing Wildfire Risk, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181, 
183 (2016) (identifying the risk “of homes in or near areas where the nature vegetation 
is prone to burning from wildfire”); Colburn, Fire Next Time, supra note 13, at 240-42 
(noting the consequences of “human migration toward forests”); Trego, supra note 12, 
at 605-06 (articulating how urban sprawl has impacted “the frequency, intensity, and 
cost of wildfire suppression in the United States”). 
 19 See Kaplan & Sellers, supra note 4. 
 20 See generally SONIA A. HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA: THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
AMERICAN LAND-USE REGULATION (2014) (providing an overview of zoning and land use 
planning). 
 21 See PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES R. SEGERDAHL, POLICYHOLDER’S 
GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE § 13.02[A][1] (1st ed. 1997 & Supp. 2019) 
(citing RANDOLPH FIELDS, FINDING LOST TREASURE — HISTORICAL REVIEW OF FIRST PARTY 
PROPERTY POLICIES 3 (1991)). 
 22 See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance Against 
Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 187 (2012); J. David Cummins, Should the Government 
Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?, 88 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 337, 342-43 
(2006); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in 
Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 10-11 (2006). 
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actuarially sound premiums and spread the risk across a large enough 
pool of insureds with diverse risk profiles.23 Consequently, many losses 
due to natural catastrophes are either uninsured or underinsured in 
America.24  
Unlike random house fires, the wildfires that now are occurring in 
the West look and act like correlated risks. For example, the Camp Fire 
that wiped out the entire town of Paradise, California in 2018 was a 
correlated risk — there were numerous losses from the same peril in 
the same geographic area at approximately the same time.25  
Property policies, such as homeowners insurance, however, do not 
make a distinction between “regular” fires and wildfires. So, a house 
that is burned to the ground by a fire is covered regardless of whether 
the fire was caused by defective electrical wiring, an uncorrelated risk, 
or a wildfire, a correlated risk. Instead of redrafting homeowners 
policies to distinguish between correlated and uncorrelated risks of fire 
loss, however, insurers simply have been refusing to renew policies for 
homeowners in wildfire areas in recent years or attempting to increase 
their premiums by dramatic amounts.26  
This Article addresses the wildfire crisis in four parts. Part One 
provides a discussion regarding climate change and the other causes of 
the wildfire crisis in America today. Part Two discusses the insurance 
industry’s response to the current wildfire crisis. Part Three discusses 
ways to mitigate the wildfire crisis. Part Four addresses insuring wildfire 
and other natural catastrophe losses moving forward. In doing so, it 
includes an analysis regarding how other developed countries, such as 
Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and 
Switzerland, insure natural catastrophe losses. Part Four also discusses 
the numerous problems with insuring natural catastrophes on a peril by 
 
 23 See Bruggeman et al., supra note 22, at 187. 
 24 See Facts + Statistics: U.S. Catastrophes, supra note 9 (noting that in 2018, there 
were approximately $33 billion in uninsured losses caused by natural catastrophes). 
 25 See Katherine Blunt & Russell Gold, PG&E Says Its Equipment Was Probable 
‘Ignition Point’ of Camp Fire, Takes $11.5 Billion in Charges, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 
2019, 6:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-records-10-5-billion-charge-
related-to-camp-fire-11551363969 [https://perma.cc/V65R-WHVB] [hereinafter 
Ignition Point]; Michael Brice-Saddler, PG&E Power Lines to Blame for California’s 
Deadliest Wildfire Ever, Officials Say, WASH. POST (May 15, 2019, 6:25 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/05/15/camp-fire-caused-by-electrical-
lines-owned-operated-by-pge-authorities-say/ [https://perma.cc/3QKP-Y46X]; Nicole 
Friedman, The Bond That Could Be Wiped Out by California’s Wildfires, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
5, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-bond-that-could-be-wiped-out-
by-californias-wildfires-1544005801 [https://perma.cc/6CF9-YMBR] [hereinafter Fire-
Bond]. 
 26 See sources cited supra note 6. 
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peril basis, using the National Flood Insurance Program as an example 
of an insurance program for a single peril that is failing. Ultimately, the 
Article concludes by offering the solution of covering natural 
catastrophe risks, including wildfires, floods, landslides, and 
hurricanes, under a bundled property insurance policy sold by a 
governmental entity. 
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CAUSES OF THE WILDFIRE CRISIS IN 
AMERICA 
A. Climate Change 
Climate change is playing a significant role in the increased intensity 
of wildfires in America. Prior to the industrial revolution, atmospheric 
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) ranged between 180 and 280 parts per million 
(“ppm”) for the prior several hundred thousand years.27 In recent years, 
the CO2 level has been measured at greater than 400 ppm.28 Humans are 
contributing to the increase in atmospheric CO2 through the burning of 
fossil fuels and deforestation.29 The average air temperature in western 
America has increased by approximately 2.34 degrees Fahrenheit since 
1895 with most of that increase occurring since the 1970s.30 Seventeen 
of the eighteen warmest years on record have occurred since 2000.31 
Western America is projected to warm by another seven to twelve 
degrees Fahrenheit by 2100 if no global climate policy is adopted.32 
The problem of global climate change is not a recent discovery. 
Scientists have been warning the world about climate change since the 
mid-1960s with increasingly dire messages each decade.33 By 1990, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) had issued a 
 
 27 See F. Joos, The Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Perturbation, 27 EUROPHYSICS NEWS 
213, 217 (1996). 
 28 See C. Le Quéré et al., Global Carbon Budget 2015, 7 EARTH SYS. SCI. DATA 349, 
351 (2015). 
 29 See id. at 377-79. 
 30 See John T. Abatzoglou & Lauren E. Parker, Climate Change and the American 
West, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 270-71 (2018). 
 31 See DONALD J. WUEBBLES, DAVID W. FAHEY & KATHY A. HIBBARD, U.S. GLOB. 
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL 
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 13 (2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov [https://perma. 
cc/8B9L-5PMU] (“Sixteen of the warmest years on record for the globe occurred in the 
last 17 years.”); A. Sánchez-Lugo, C. Morice, P. Berrisford & A. Argüez, Global Surface 
Temperatures, in STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN 2016, at 11, 11 (2017). 
 32 See Abatzoglou & Parker, supra note 30, at 273. 
 33 See Cale Jaffe, Melting the Polarization Around Climate Change Politics, 30 GEO. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 455, 459-60 (2018). 
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report that stated a scientific consensus had concluded that “emissions 
resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the 
atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases . . . . These 
increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an 
additional warming of the Earth’s surface.”34  
Since that initial report in 1990, each of the subsequent IPCC reports 
has concluded that the problem is only getting worse. For example, in 
2014, the IPCC’s fifth report stated:  
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 
1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over 
decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, 
the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has 
risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have 
increased . . . . Each of the last three decades has been 
successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any preceding 
decade since 1850.35 
The consequences of climate change are alarming:  
Thousands of studies conducted by researchers around the 
world have documented changes in surface, atmospheric, and 
oceanic temperatures; melting glaciers; diminishing snow 
cover; shrinking sea ice; rising sea levels; ocean acidification; 
and increasing atmospheric water vapor . . . . [G]lobal average 
sea level has risen by about 7–8 inches since 1900, with almost 
half (about 3 inches) of that rise occurring since 1993 . . . . 
[T]he incidence of daily tidal flooding is accelerating in more 
than 25 Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities. Global average sea levels 
are expected to continue to rise . . . [and a] rise of as much as 8 
feet by 2100 cannot be ruled out . . . . Heavy rainfall is 
increasing in intensity and frequency across the United States 
. . . . Heatwaves have become more frequent in the United States 
since the 1960s . . . . Annual trends toward earlier spring melt 
and reduced snowpack are already affecting water resources in 
the western United States and these trends are expected to 
continue . . . . [C]hronic, long-duration hydrological drought is 
increasingly possible before the end of this century . . . . The 
 
 34 Id. at 462 (quoting CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, at xi (J.T. 
Houghton et al. eds., 1990)). 
 35 Cinnamon Carlarne, Delinking International Environmental Law & Climate 
Change, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 7 (2014) (quoting INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2 (2015)). 
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incidence of large forest fires in the western United States and 
Alaska has increased since the early 1980s and is projected to 
further increase in those regions . . . .36 
The rising temperatures have shortened the snow cover season and 
created a much longer fire season with drier conditions.37 In western 
America, the fire season has increased from 200 days in 1980 to 300 
days in 2013, while Texas’s and Oklahoma’s fire season increased from 
less than 100 days to 300 days.38 This longer, drier fire season due to 
climate change has contributed to an increase in the number and 
severity of wildfires. As discussed in the next part, however, climate 
change is only one of the causes of the wildfire crisis in America.  
B. The Other Causes of the Wildfire Crisis in America 
In addition to climate change contributing to the problem, wildfires 
are more common and catastrophic today than they were in the past 
because of forest management practices over the past century and the 
encroachment of civilization into wildlands over the past three 
decades.39  
By the early 1900s, wildfires were considered a bane to civilization, 
in part, because forests were viewed as a timber resource.40 
Consequently, the Bureau of Forestry, the predecessor to the U.S. Forest 
 
 36 See WUEBBLES ET AL., supra note 31, at 10-11. 
 37 See sources cited supra note 16. 
 38 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-357, WILDLAND FIRE RISK 
REDUCTION: MULTIPLE FACTORS AFFECT FEDERAL-NONFEDERAL COLLABORATION, BUT 
ACTION COULD BE TAKEN TO BETTER MEASURE PROGRESS 8 (2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684545.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MML-G46T] [hereinafter 
GAO-17-357 REPORT]. 
 39 See, e.g., LLOYD DIXON, FLAVIA TSANG & GARY FITTS, CALIFORNIA NAT. RES. AGENCY, 
THE IMPACT OF CHANGING WILDFIRE RISK ON CALIFORNIA’S RESIDENTIAL INSURANCE 
MARKET 69 (2018), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/Forests_ 
CCCA4-CNRA-2018-008_ada.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YCT-ZNHW] [hereinafter THE 
IMPACT OF CHANGING WILDFIRE RISK] (noting the importance of fuel control to wildfire 
risk management); GAO-17-357 REPORT, supra note 38, at 8 (noting specific forest 
management practices that have led to more severe wildfires); Berry et al., supra note 
18, at 183-84 (describing the way urban sprawl has led to “the potential for more 
damaging wildfires than in past decades”); Donahue, supra note 13, at 388 (describing 
the ways human activity has contributed to catastrophic wildfires); Trego, supra note 
12, at 602, 605 (describing the way urban sprawl and the wildfire/urban interface has 
contributed to the catastrophic risk associated with wildfires). 
 40 See Barrett, supra note 14, at 7; Colburn, Retreat Alternatives, supra note 12, at 30 
(“Before it was the WUI locking the federal and state governments into an assault on 
fire, timber and taxes did so.”). 
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Service, was created in 1905 to fight wildfires.41 Over the next seventy 
years, the U.S. Forest Service spent a lot of time and money fighting 
fires, and it was very effective in suppressing fires.42  
By the 1970s, however, the U. S. Forest Service had learned that fire 
suppression was unnatural because certain aspects of the environment 
depend on fires, and fire suppression actually has some previously 
unrecognized negative environmental consequences.43 These negative 
consequences include the overgrowth of forests with thick, dead 
underbrush that is easy to ignite and, in turn, cause more intense fires 
when fires inevitably occur.44  
Wildfires occur naturally and are part of a healthy ecosystem. In fact, 
some species of trees need fire to regenerate, as fire is needed to trigger 
seedling regeneration.45 Other species need the heat from fire to crack 
the seed’s coating to allow for germination.46 Wildfires also restore 
minerals to the soil, which aids future vegetation growth.47  
 
 41 See PYNE ET AL., supra note 12, at 246-47 (describing the history of forest 
management in America); Trego, supra note 12, at 598 (describing the origins of the 
Bureau of Forestry and the agency’s purpose). 
 42 See, e.g., GORTE, supra note 12, at 1 (“Efforts to control wildfires were founded 
on a belief that fast, aggressive control was efficient.”); PYNE ET AL., supra note 12, at 248 
(describing the history of forest management in America); Barton, supra note 1, at 698-
99 (describing a U.S. Forest Service policy that aimed “to control fires exceeding ten 
acres in size before 10:00 a.m. the next day”); Colburn, Retreat Alternatives, supra note 
12, at 6 (citing STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND 
RURAL FIRE 275-87 (1982)) (“For much of the twentieth century, the Forest Service and 
Department of Interior land managers implemented what was known as the ‘10 A.M.’ 
policy: attacking any discovered wildfire on the lands they administer with the goal of 
extinguishing it by mid-morning the next day.”); Trego, supra note 12, at 599 (“With 
an overwhelming amount of resources, the Forest Service was extremely successful in 
suppressing fire for many years.”). 
 43 See, e.g., Barton, supra note 1, at 698-99 (describing how fire suppression led to 
“catastrophic and extremely difficult (and expensive) [fires] to control”); Colburn, Fire 
Next Time, supra note 13, at 226-27 (noting “most professionals knew that the policy of 
wide scale fire suppression had been a serious mistake”); Donahue, supra note 13, at 
390 (describing the consequences of wildfire suppression); Trego, supra note 12, at 599-
602 (“A change in policy came in the 1970s.”). 
 44 See sources cited supra note 43.  
 45 See GAO-17-357 REPORT, supra note 38, at 8. 
 46 See Trego, supra note 12, at 600. 
 47 Id. at 600-01. 
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The immediate triggering cause of a wildfire is either lightning or 
humans.48 In recent years, the vast majority of wildfires have been 
caused by humans.49  
Controlled fires are one means of attempting to address the buildup 
of fire fuels in forests that historically was used by Native Americans 
and early European settlers.50 Such fires, however, sometimes get out of 
control and the smoke from the fires lowers air quality.51 Controlled 
fires also can impact the natural habitats of certain types of wildlife.52 
Because of these negative side effects, controlled burns have not been 
used widely enough in western America to mimic naturally occurring 
wildfires. 
Encroachment by civilization on the wilderness also has played a 
significant role in increasing the costs and damages associated with 
wildfires.53 Most new houses today are being built in an area known as 
the Wildland Urban Interface (“WUI”).54 Indeed, since 1960, there has 
 
 48 See, e.g., Berry et al., supra note 18, at 185 (noting “[o]n average, 57% of the 
wildfires were human caused, while 43% were lightning caused”); Trego, supra note 12, 
at 600 (“Historically, wildfires in the United States occurred naturally by lightning 
strike, but as our population has grown, the number of human-caused wildfires has 
increased extraordinarily.”). 
 49 See, e.g., GAO-17-357 REPORT, supra note 38, at 15 (“From 2001 through 2011, 
approximately 85 percent of wildfires in the United States were human-caused, 
according to the National Interagency Fire Center.”); Colburn, Retreat Alternatives, 
supra note 12, at 13 (citing Jennifer Balch et al., Human-Started Wildfires Expand the Fire 
Niche Across the United States, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2946, 2946 (2017)) (“An 
exhaustive study of records from 1992 to 2012 by Balch and her colleagues found that 
about 84% of all wildfires and almost half of the total area burned stemmed from human 
ignitions, adding an average of 40,000 more wildfires per year.”). 
 50 See Barrett, supra note 14, at 6-7; Barton, supra note 1, at 711; Kanner & Reilly, 
supra note 14, at 60. 
 51 See sources cited supra note 50. 
 52 See Kanner & Reilly, supra note 14, at 60; Young, supra note 14, at 306-07. 
 53 See, e.g., QUARLES & POHL, supra note 2, at 1 (noting the number of homes lost to 
wildfires in the last decade); Berry et al., supra note 18, at 182-83 (explaining the growth 
of the “wildland/urban interface (WUI)”); Colburn, Fire Next Time, supra note 13, at 
240-41 (describing human migration toward forests); Trego, supra note 12, at 605 
(describing the WUI as the area “where combustible homes meet combustible 
vegetation”). 
 54 See, e.g., GAO-17-357 REPORT, supra note 38, at 11 (“According to the 2014 
Quadrennial Fire Review, 60 percent of new homes built in the United States since 1990 
were built in the WUI, which contains 46 million single-family homes, representing 
about 40 percent of single-family homes in the United States.”); Berry et al., supra note 
18, at 182-83 (noting how “new development has taken place and continues to flourish 
in areas of historic fire occurrence and within ecosystems in which plant and animal 
species are fire-adapted or fire-dependent”); Colburn, Fire Next Time, supra note 13, at 
240-41 (describing the “fastest growing category of real estate in America”); Donahue, 
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been a 720 percent increase in the number of people living in the WUI.55 
People like to live on the edge of the wilderness because of the natural 
scenery, access to public lands, privacy, and a rural lifestyle.56 In some 
parts of the country, such as California, the lack of affordable housing 
in urban areas has also been driving people to move to the WUI.57 Yet, 
with more homes being built on the edge of dry, combustible forests 
comes a greater risk of catastrophic wildfires because more homes are 
located in high-risk danger areas. 
II. THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S RESPONSE TO THE WILDFIRE CRISIS 
The insurance industry’s response to the wildfire crisis has been both 
similar and dissimilar to its historical responses to insuring other 
natural catastrophes. This is because wildfire losses now appear to be 
correlated risks, yet historically insurers have always covered fire losses 
under property insurance.  
A. Wildfires and Correlated Risks 
Insurers historically have avoided insuring natural catastrophe losses 
that are viewed as correlated risks, and wildfires now appear to be 
correlated risks.58 Correlated risks are situations where numerous 
people in concentrated areas have essentially the same risk of the same 
type of loss occurring at approximately the same time.59 Correlated risk 
concerns are greatest when an insurer sells insurance only in a limited 
geographic area because the pool of insureds is limited, and all of the 
insureds in the same area are likely to face the same natural hazards at 
the same time. For example, people who live in the same neighborhood 
generally face similar risks of natural catastrophes such as flooding and 
earthquakes, which are classic examples of correlated risks.60 Insurers 
generally attempt to avoid insuring correlated risks due to actuarial and 
capitalization concerns. They contend they cannot accurately predict 
the frequency or severity of such losses or collect enough premiums to 
spread the risk of loss across a large enough pool of insureds to cover 
 
supra note 13, at 391 (discussing development in the WUI); Trego, supra note 12, at 
605 (“The WUI is ‘the fastest growing category of real estate in America.’”). 
 55 Barton, supra note 1, at 709. 
 56 See, e.g., QUARLES & POHL, supra note 2, at 7. 
 57 See STRIKE FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. 
 58 See supra notes 22, 25 and accompanying text. 
 59 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 60 See Correlated Risks, WORLD FIN. (June 30, 2010), http://www.worldfinance.com/ 
home/risk-encyclopaedia/correlated-risks [https://perma.cc/CQ3D-865A]. 
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the losses when they occur.61 Consequently, natural catastrophes that 
are viewed as correlated risks typically are excluded from coverage 
under “all risk”62 homeowners and “all risk” commercial property 
insurance policies.63 In 2018, for example, there were approximately 
$225 billion in losses associated with natural catastrophes worldwide, 
but insurance only covered $90 billion, which means sixty percent of 
the losses were uninsured.64 
Wildfires appear to be correlated risks because property owners in the 
same geographic areas would appear to have similar risks of losing their 
homes to wildfires. Yet, insurers historically have not excluded wildfires 
from coverage under all risk homeowners and commercial property 
policies. There are a couple of explanations for this.  
First, one person’s risk of losing her home to a wildfire is not 
completely correlated to a neighbor’s risk of losing her home to a 
wildfire because, as is discussed in Part III, a homeowner can take steps 
to dramatically lower the risk of wildfire damage even if a neighboring 
property owner does not take similar preventative steps. Consequently, 
fire resistant homes located in a neighborhood engulfed by a wildfire 
may suffer little or no damage.  
Second, fire is the oldest and original peril covered by property 
policies, with the first fire insurance policies being sold in England in 
the 1660s.65 So, instead of attempting to distinguish between regular fire 
losses and wildfires losses and then attempting to exclude coverage for 
the latter, some insurers are now simply refusing to sell property 
insurance to people at high risk of wildfires or dropping existing high-
risk customers.66  
Insurers’ conduct in this regard is an example of a phenomenon 
known as “reverse adverse selection.” Adverse selection is “the 
disproportionate tendency of those who are more likely to suffer losses 
to seek insurance against those losses.”67 The individual mandate under 
 
 61 See Bruggeman et al., supra note 22, at 187; Cummins, supra note 22, at 342-44. 
 62 “All risk” property insurance covers all risks of loss except for perils specifically 
excluded. See KALIS ET AL., supra note 21, § 13.02[B]. 
 63 See sources cited supra note 8. 
 64 See Insurance Covered $90B of Natural Disaster Losses in 2018, Leaving 60% 
Protection Gap, INS. J. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
international/2019/01/22/515420.htm [https://perma.cc/Z5XL-88AJ] (citing AON, 
WEATHER, CLIMATE & CATASTROPHE INSIGHT – 2018 INSIGHT REPORT 2 (2018)). 
 65 See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 
17 (5th ed. 2012). 
 66 See supra notes 6, 7. 
 67 Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and 
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. 
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the Affordable Care Act that required everyone to have health insurance 
or pay a penalty is an example of adverse selection at work.68 Insurers 
were concerned that only old and sick people would buy health 
insurance if buying health insurance were not required.69 
Reverse adverse selection, on the other hand, arises when insurers use 
claims and risk data to create a risk profile for each prospective insured 
and then charge much higher premiums to high-risk insureds or refuse 
to insure them entirely.70 Indeed, if not for laws prohibiting it, insurers 
would refuse, for example, to sell life, health, and disability insurance 
to victims of domestic abuse because they are more likely to suffer 
injuries or death and thus, they are viewed as unprofitable, bad risks 
from an insurance underwriting perspective.71 Insurers also would use 
genetic profiling to avoid insuring certain people deemed to be at 
unacceptably high risks of disease or death if it were not prohibited by 
law.72 As things currently stand, in most states, insurers are allowed to 
drop a policyholder as a customer for many risks and lines of insurance 
if the policyholder is viewed as a high-risk customer.73 And, as 
discussed in the next part, until the recent passage of a new law 
 
REV. 75, 102 n.82 (1993); see also Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: 
Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373-75 (2003). 
 68 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2018) (intending to “broaden the health 
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance 
premiums”); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548 (2012) (“[T]he 
mandate forces into the insurance risk pool more healthy individuals, whose premiums 
on average will be higher than their health care expenses. This allows insurers to 
subsidize the costs of covering the unhealthy individuals the reforms require them to 
accept.”); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 
360 (6th ed. 2015). 
 69 See source cited supra note 68.  
 70 See, e.g., JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T 
PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 14 (2010) (explaining how insurers use 
claims data); Baker, supra note 67, at 380-81 (describing an alternative approach where 
risk-based pricing and underwriting would be limited or prohibited and the purchase 
of insurance would not be required); Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing 
Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 206, 209-11 
(2012) [hereinafter Outsourcing Regulation] (examining how insurers gain information 
during the underwriting process and insurers’ informational advantages); Peter 
Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 
1223, 1245, 1248-49, 1251-52, 1263 (2004) (discussing the sources of informational 
asymmetry between insurers and insureds). 
 71 See Baker, supra note 67, at 392. 
 72 See id. at 394 n.53. 
 73 In some states, such as California, however, insurers are not allowed to drop a 
policyholder as a customer for two years after the policyholder has suffered a fire loss. 
See Walsh, supra note 2. 
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temporarily prohibiting it, insurers in California had been dropping 
their customers in areas at high risk for wildfires in increasing numbers 
in response to the wildfire crisis.74 
B. Insurers’ Reaction to the 2017 and 2018 Wildfires 
Insurers’ refusal to sell insurance for correlated risks and the use of 
reverse adverse selection to avoid insuring high-risk customers is not 
irrational. Indeed, if an insurance company is not well capitalized and 
is exposed to correlated risks because its pool of insureds is located in 
a non-diverse geographic footprint, then the insurer is at risk for 
insolvency in the event of a natural catastrophe. Following Hurricane 
Andrew in Florida in 1992, for example, numerous insurers became 
insolvent.75 And, at least one California insurer already has become 
insolvent due to the 2018 Camp Fire because it primarily insured 
property owners in Paradise, California, which lost over 90 percent of 
its houses as a result of the wildfire.76 
Some states, such as California, have laws designed to counter 
insurers’ attempts to dramatically raise premium rates or refuse to 
renew policies for homeowners whose properties have been damaged 
by wildfires. Under one law, premium rates must be based on the prior 
twenty years of claims data, as opposed to future loss projections; thus, 
insurers cannot dramatically raise premium rates the year after 
catastrophic wildfires strike like the ones that occurred in 2017 and 
2018.77 California uses historical loss data rather than risk models to 
 
 74 See Christopher Flavelle & Brad Plumer, California Bans Insurers from Dropping 
Policies Made Riskier by Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/05/climate/california-fire-insurance-climate.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z7XJ-B39V]. 
 75 See LYNNE MCCHRISTIAN, INS. INFO. INST., HURRICANE ANDREW AND INSURANCE: THE 
ENDURING IMPACT OF AN HISTORIC STORM 4-5 (2012), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/ 
files/paper_HurricaneAndrew_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET3K-ET7C]; Cassandra R. 
Cole, David A. Macpherson, Patrick F. Maroney, Kathleen A. McCullough, James W. 
Newman, Jr. & Charles Nyce, The Use of Postloss Financing of Catastrophic Risk, 14 RISK 
MGMT. & INS. REV. 265, 266 (2011). 
 76 See Dale Kasler & Michael Finch II, Insurer Goes Bust from Camp Fire with Millions in 
Claims Unpaid. How Will It Affect Paradise Homeowners?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 3, 2018, 
12:00 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/fires/article222563185.html 
[https://perma.cc/7K58-3B9B]; Kristin Lam, Northern California Town of Paradise Lost 90% 
of Its Population After Camp Fire, Data Shows, USA TODAY (July 11, 2019, 11:14 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/07/11/paradise-california-population-
camp-fire-california-wildfire-fund/1710525001/ [https://perma.cc/KHU5-G77G]. 
 77 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2644.5 (2020) (“In those insurance lines and 
coverages where catastrophes occur, the catastrophic losses of any one accident year in 
the recorded period are replaced by a loading based on a multi-year, long-term average 
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establish premium rates because insurance regulators are skeptical of 
the accuracy of forecast models and insurers tend to err on the side of 
requesting unnecessarily high premium rates when making loss 
forecasts.78 Nonetheless, many major insurers have sought to raise 
premium rates since they incurred catastrophic wildfire losses of 
approximately $24 billion in 2017 and 2018.79  
Under another law, insurers are not permitted to drop policyholders 
as insureds for two years after a “covered disaster.”80 That law does not, 
however, protect many policyholders who live in high-risk areas but 
were lucky enough not to be hit by the wildfires in 2017 or 2018, 
because insurers have been dropping them as customers in an attempt 
to avoid future losses by continuing to insure homes in high-risk 
areas.81 Indeed, Allstate Insurance Company has reduced the number of 
homeowners policies it sells in California by 50 percent over the past 
decade due to wildfire risk concerns.82 The difficulty of obtaining 
homeowners insurance in some parts of California is so great that it is 
also impacting homeowners’ ability to sell their houses because buyers 
do not think they can obtain insurance for the houses at an affordable 
price.83  
If a homeowner is unable to purchase property insurance from an 
insurer that is licensed and “admitted” to do business in the state, then 
the homeowner can seek insurance from a “surplus” insurer.84 Surplus 
insurers are not regulated with the same rigor as admitted insurers.85 
For example, surplus insurers are not subject to state premium rate 
 
of catastrophe claims. The number of years over which the average shall be calculated 
shall be at least 20 years for homeowners multiple peril fire . . . .”). 
 78 See Flavelle & Plumer, supra note 74. 
 79 See Friedman, High Cost, supra note 7. 
 80 Walsh, supra note 2. 
 81 See Flavelle, supra note 6; Friedman, High Cost, supra note 7. 
 82 See Flavelle, supra note 6; Friedman, Wildfire Insurance, supra note 6. 
 83 See Friedman, High Cost, supra note 7. 
 84 See DIXON ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CHANGING WILDFIRE RISK, supra note 39, at 32. 
 85 See, e.g., JOHN F. DOBBYN & CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH, INSURANCE LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 517 (5th ed. 2016) (“‘[S]urplus line’ insurers . . . are not licensed in the state 
. . . . [T]he premium rates charged by surplus line insurers are unregulated, the policy 
provisions are not reviewed and approved by state regulators, insolvency assurances are 
not provided, and guaranty fund protections are unavailable.”); RAYMOND A. GUENTER 
& ELISABETH DITOMASSI, FUNDAMENTALS OF INSURANCE REGULATION: THE RULES AND THE 
RATIONALE 295 (2017) (“The activities of non-admitted insurers take place outside the 
jurisdiction in which the insured resides. They are shielded to a significant degree from 
the application of the state’s insurance laws by Constitutional due process 
restrictions.”). 
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regulation, so they generally charge higher premium rates.86 Surplus 
insurers also are not covered by the state’s insurance guarantee program 
in the event the insurer becomes insolvent, so policyholders bear the 
full risk of insurer insolvency.87 Between 2018 and 2019, the number of 
homeowners in California being forced to purchase insurance from 
surplus insurers nearly doubled.88 
If a homeowner cannot purchase insurance from either an admitted 
or a surplus insurer in California, for example, then the homeowner can 
get insurance from the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (“FAIR”) 
Plan, which is a fire insurance pool comprised of all of the admitted 
insurers in the state.89 A FAIR Plan policy provides much more limited 
coverage than a standard homeowners insurance policy because it does 
not include liability coverage or coverage for other common perils 
typically covered, such as water damage and theft.90 Since 2015, the 
number of homeowners procuring FAIR Plan policies in California has 
increased by 177 percent in high-risk areas.91 And, in 2019, the FAIR 
Plan increased its premium rates by twenty percent.92 
Despite the existence of the FAIR Plan and surplus insurers, the 
number of admitted insurers that are dropping existing customers and 
refusing to enroll new customers in high-risk areas has been so 
significant that California recently passed a statute that prevents 
insurers, for one year, from dropping any customers who live in or 
alongside ZIP codes struck by recent wildfires.93 This response by 
legislators to insurers’ refusal to sell insurance in areas recently 
devastated by a natural catastrophe is not unprecedented. Following 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, insurers similarly attempted to exit 
 
 86 See DIXON ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CHANGING WILDFIRE RISK, supra note 39, at 33. 
 87 Id. at 32. 
 88 See California’s Homeowners’ Insurance Market: A Report by the FAIR Plan, 
Informational Hearing Before the Assembly Comm. on Ins., 2019-20 Leg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 
2019) (testimony of Cliston Brown, Vice President of Comms. & Gov’t Relations, 
Surplus Line Ass’n of Cal.), https://ains.assembly.ca.gov/sites/ains.assembly.ca.gov/files/ 
hearings/Hearing%20Materials_082119.pdf [https:perma.cc/J59W-3GY7] [hereinafter 
FAIR Plan Report]. 
 89 See DIXON ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CHANGING WILDFIRE RISK, supra note 39, at 33; 
Friedman, Wildfire Insurance, supra note 6. 
 90 See DIXON ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CHANGING WILDFIRE RISK, supra note 39, at 33. 
 91 See Flavelle, supra note 6; Natalie Orenstein, Insurance Firms Drop Berkeley Hills 
Homeowners, Citing Wildfire Risk, BERKELEYSIDE (Sept. 9, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.berkeleyside.com/2019/09/09/insurance-companies-give-the-boot-to-
berkeley-hills-homeowners-citing-fire-risk [https://perma.cc/265D-GHPB]. 
 92 See FAIR Plan Report, supra note 88, at 6. 
 93 See Flavelle & Plumer, supra note 74. 
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Florida’s homeowners insurance market and the Florida state legislators 
similarly passed a law temporarily prohibiting them from doing so.94  
Unfortunately, for homeowners who are fortunate enough to have 
insurance to cover wildfire losses, most of them are grossly 
underinsured such that their insurance is not adequate to replace their 
lost homes.95 Indeed, it is estimated that at least two thirds of insured 
homeowners suffering wildfire losses are underinsured.96 This is 
primarily because homeowners policies do not provide “guaranteed 
replacement coverage” and consumers are uninformed regarding the 
cost to replace their homes if their homes are completely destroyed by 
a wildfire or another natural catastrophe. Consequently, most 
homeowners purchase an inadequate amount of coverage.97  
Homeowners, however, are not the only entities uninsured or 
underinsured with respect to wildfires. Consider, for example, Pacific 
Gas & Electric Corporation’s (“PG&E”) current plight. PG&E provides 
gas and electricity to sixteen million customers across a 70,000 square-
mile territory.98 Fire investigators have determined that PG&E was 
responsible for starting at least eighteen wildfires in California in 2017 
that killed twenty-two people.99 PG&E also has admitted that its 
equipment started the most devastating wildfire in California’s history 
in 2018 — the Camp Fire — that destroyed more than 18,800 structures 
and killed at least eighty-five people.100 California is one of two states 
 
 94 See 1993 Fla. Laws, ch. 93-401; Jonathan Brennan Butler, Insurers Under Fire: 
Assessing the Constitutionality of Florida’s Residential Property Insurance Moratorium 
After Hurricane Andrew, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 734-35 (1995); Dwight M. Jaffee & 
Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. 
RISK & INS. 205, 206 (1997). 
 95 See Liam Denning, Wildfire Took Your Home? Don’t Count on Insurance Rebuilding 
It, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/wildfire-took-
your-home-don-t-count-on-insurance-rebuilding-it-1.1242941 [https://perma.cc/8WXG-
55CY]. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. See generally Kenneth S. Klein, Minding the Protection Gap: Resolving 
Unintended, Pervasive, Profound Homeowner Underinsurance, 25 CONN. INS. L.J. 34 
(2018) (discussing the problem of homeowner underinsurance and the legal 
protections for insurers). 
 98 Ivan Penn, Thomas Fuller & Lisa Friedman, PG&E Bankruptcy Tests Who Will 
Pay for California Wildfires, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/01/14/business/energy-environment/pge-bankruptcy-california.html [https://perma. 
cc/JTH4-DPC6] [hereinafter Who Will Pay]; see also Blunt & Gold, PG&E Delayed Safety 
Work, supra note 2. 
 99 See Gold & Blunt, Wildfires Drove PG&E to Bankruptcy, supra note 2. 
 100 See Blunt & Gold, PG&E Delayed Safety Work, supra note 2; Brice-Saddler, supra 
note 25; Friedman, Fire-Bond, supra note 25. 
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that hold utilities strictly liable for fires started by their equipment, so 
PG&E has little in the way of defenses to liability.101 PG&E estimates 
that it only has approximately $1.4 billion in insurance to cover its 
liabilities.102 Yet, PG&E’s wildfire liabilities were estimated at more than 
$30 billion when PG&E filed for bankruptcy on January 29, 2019, and 
it recorded a $10.5 billion charge for its potential Camp Fire 
liabilities.103 PG&E’s attorneys estimate “there are between 70,000 and 
100,000 people [who are] eligible to file wildfire claims against the 
company.”104  
Because PG&E provides gas and electricity to sixteen million 
customers, it is too big and important to simply allow it to fail as a going 
concern.105 Consequently, on July 12, 2019, California enacted a law 
that creates a $21 billion fund to pay for future wildfire damage caused 
by utilities such as PG&E.106 Also, beginning in the fall of 2019, PG&E 
began cutting power to millions of its customers on windy days in an 
attempt to prevent its equipment from causing additional wildfires.107 
In December 2019, PG&E settled with its past victims for a total of 
$13.5 billion, with some of that money going to government agencies 
and attorneys.108 Of course, only paying $13.5 billion on a $30 billion 
liability means a lot of people will not be made whole.  
 
 101 Taylor Telford & Steven Mufson, PG&E, The Nation’s Biggest Utility Company, 
Files for Bankruptcy After California Wildfires, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2019, 4:56 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/01/29/pge-nations-biggest-utility-
company-files-bankruptcy-after-california-wildfires/ [https://perma.cc/L3NQ-AA8N]. 
 102 See Friedman, Fire-Bond, supra note 25. 
 103 See Blunt & Gold, Ignition Point, supra note 25; Penn et al., Who Will Pay, supra 
note 98. 
 104 Peg Brickley & Gretchen Morgenson, Fire Victims Confront PG&E Bankruptcy: 
Chapter 11 Rules Essentially Put a Lid on Compensation to California Wildfire Payouts, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-bankruptcy-protections-
could-mean-less-money-for-wildfire-victims-11573252033 [https://perma.cc/KN89-
3B4T]. 
 105 See Blunt & Gold, PG&E Delayed Safety Work, supra note 2; Penn et al., Who Will 
Pay, supra note 98. 
 106 See Lam, supra note 76; Alejandro Lazo & Katherine Blunt, California Legislature 
Approves Multibillion-Dollar Wildfire Fund, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-legislature-approves-multibillion-dollar-wildfire-
fund-11562870591 [https://perma.cc/NG5E-8LJB]. 
 107 See Russell Gold & Katherine Blunt, PG&E Had Systemic Problems with Power 
Line Maintenance, California Probe Finds, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-had-systemic-problems-with-power-line-maintenance-
california-probe-finds-11575338873 [https://perma.cc/C2CG-CAF9]. 
 108 Ivan Penn, Lauren Hepler & Peter Eavis, PG&E Reaches $13.5 Billion Deal with 
Wildfire Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/ 
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C. Reinsurance and Catastrophe Bonds as Alternative Risk Transfer 
Mechanisms 
There are a couple of risk transferring tools that undermine insurers’ 
claims that they cannot insure correlated risks and thus, they should be 
permitted to exclude coverage for natural catastrophes or drop high-
risk customers — reinsurance and catastrophe bonds. These two risk 
transfer mechanisms diminish the financial impact of catastrophic 
losses on individual insurers and therefore, they belie insurers’ claims 
that they cannot insure high-risk people or correlated risks. 
Reinsurance is a worldwide business wherein global reinsurers insure 
all of or portions of another insurer’s portfolio of business.109 Most 
reinsurance is sold by European and Bermuda companies.110 Two of the 
three largest reinsurers in the world, Swiss Re and Munich Re, for 
example, are European companies.111 In fact, reinsurance paid sixty 




 109 Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 17 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1109 (2015). See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. 
NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 15.01[a], [b] (Elisa Alcabes & 
Karen Cestari eds., 19th ed. 2019) (discussing reinsurance).  
 110 See, e.g., GUENTER & DITOMASSI, supra note 85, at 10 (“[Reinsurance] is also an 
international business dominated by non-U.S. companies.”); FED. INS. OFFICE, THE 
BREADTH AND SCOPE OF THE GLOBAL REINSURANCE MARKET AND THE CRITICAL ROLE SUCH 
MARKET PLAYS IN SUPPORTING INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2014) (“[I]n 2013 
approximately $46 billion in total (P/C) reinsurance premiums were ceded by U.S.-
based insurers to unaffiliated reinsurers; of this amount, approximately $28.4 billion of 
premiums were ceded to non-U.S. reinsurers and approximately $17.6 billion of 
premiums were ceded to U.S. professional reinsurers.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO/GDD-90-82, INSURANCE REGULATION: STATE REINSURANCE OVERSIGHT 
INCREASED, BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN 3 (1990) (“An individual state has no direct authority 
to regulate reinsurers in other states or countries who are not licensed in that state.”); 
Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1569, 1615 (2014) [hereinafter Regulating Systemic Risk] (“[R]einsurance is an 
international business−the largest companies are located in Europe and Bermuda.”); 
Sebastian von Dahlen & Goetz von Peter, Natural Catastrophes and Global Reinsurance 
− Exploring Linkages, CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. NEWSL., Jan. 2013, at 20, 22 n.2, 
http://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol6_nat_cat_global_re.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/8XQ8-H8TF] (“US insurers cede (transfer) nearly twice as much in premium volume 
to European reinsurers than European insurers cede to US reinsurers.”); Top 25 Non-
Life Reinsurers: Swiss Re Leads, Berkshire Drops in A.M. Best’s 2016 Ranking, INS. J. (Sept. 
12, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2016/09/12/426023.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R9Z7-SPRP] (showing that most of the world’s largest reinsurers are 
European companies). 
 111 See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 110. 
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five percent of the insured Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma losses, 
and forty percent of the insured Hurricane Sandy losses.112 
By transferring some of the risk of losses to reinsurers, insurers can 
spread the risk of wildfires losses in, for example, California throughout 
the world. Thus, by purchasing reinsurance, wildfire losses in western 
America are not correlated with the risk of losses of the entire pool of 
insureds because the pool of insureds is worldwide instead of 
geographically isolated.  
Catastrophe bonds are bonds that are issued for specific types of 
catastrophes, such as wildfires, and sold to institutional investors.113 
Catastrophe bonds emerged in the 1990s as a new way to diversify 
insurers’ risks with respect to catastrophic events following Hurricane 
Andrew in Florida and the Northridge Earthquake in California.114 
Typically, the investors receive interest payments on the bonds and the 
return of their principal at the end of the bond term unless the specified 
catastrophe occurs, in which case the investors forfeit their rights to the 
return of the principal and any additional interest payments.115 The 
retained money is then available to pay the insured losses, which means 
the true risk of loss is transferred from the insurer to the institutional 
bond holders. As of 2020, approximately $41 billion in catastrophe 
bonds covering a variety of perils were outstanding.116 
Purchasers of California wildfire catastrophe bonds likely took huge 
losses for the 2017 and 2018 wildfires. For example, in August 2018, 
PG&E sold $200 million in catastrophe bonds.117 Three months later 
the devastating Camp Fire occurred, for which PG&E booked a $10.5 
billion loss.118 In total, it has been estimated that approximately $4.6 
billion in outstanding catastrophe bonds have exposure to California 
wildfire risks.119 Of course, with the massive wildfire losses in recent 
years, one would expect that investors’ appetites for wildfire catastrophe 
bonds may be somewhat sated. Nonetheless, catastrophe bonds are 
another way that insurers can continue to cover high-risk homeowners 
 
 112 See FED. INS. OFFICE, supra note 110, at 15. 
 113 See Friedman, Fire-Bond, supra note 25. 
 114 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-941, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS: 
THE ROLE OF RISK-LINKED SECURITIES AND FACTORS AFFECTING THEIR USE 15-16 (2002). 
 115 See Scales supra note 22, at 46. 
 116 See Catastrophe Bonds & ILS Risk Capital Issued & Outstanding by Year, ARTEMIS, 
https://www.artemis.bm/dashboard/catastrophe-bonds-ils-issued-and-outstanding-by-
year/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7UCF-39YF]. 
 117 See Friedman, Fire-Bond, supra note 25. 
 118 See Blunt & Gold, Ignition Point, supra note 25 (describing PG&E’s economic 
losses following major California fires such as the 2018 Camp Fire). 
 119 See Friedman, Fire-Bond, supra note 25. 
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while spreading the risk of loss, rather than simply refusing to insure 
people who live in high-risk areas. 
III. WAYS TO MINIMIZE WILDFIRE DAMAGE 
Wildfires currently present a $187 billion property risk problem, 
annually cause billions in unquantified business interruption losses, 
and cause the deaths of numerous people each year. Until the past few 
years, the insurance industry generally had stayed the course by 
continuing to cover wildfire losses, but that has changed as insurers 
have been refusing to renew policies for high-risk properties and are 
seeking premium hikes in dramatic amounts.120 One can expect that 
trend to continue because the wildfire crisis is only getting worse due 
to climate change, past fire suppression measures, and increased 
property development in the WUI. Because private insurers are in the 
business of making money, they will not voluntarily continue to insure 
wildfire losses if the losses in 2017 and 2018 portend the future. 
Consequently, in this Part of the Article, some ways to reduce and 
mitigate wildfire risks are discussed. 
A. Reverse Climate Change 
Reversing climate change would help address the wildfire crisis. As 
the U.S. Global Change Research Program has stated: 
The magnitude of climate change beyond the next few decades 
will depend primarily on the amount of greenhouse gases 
(especially carbon dioxide) emitted globally. Without major 
reductions in emissions, the increase in annual average global 
temperature relative to preindustrial times could reach 9°F 
(5°C) or more by the end of this century. With significant 
reductions in emissions, the increase in annual average global 
temperature could be limited to 3.6°F (2°C) or less.121  
Thus, with the limited technologies that currently are available to 
capture and eliminate atmospheric CO2, reducing global CO2 emissions 
appears to be the primary means of reversing climate change.122  
 
 120 See supra Part II.B. 
 121 WUEBBLES ET AL., supra note 31, at 11. 
 122 See, e.g., SCI. ADVICE FOR POLICY BY EUROPEAN ACADS. CONSORTIUM, NOVEL CARBON 
CAPTURE AND UTILISATION TECHNOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND CLIMATE ASPECTS 8 (2018), 
https://www.sapea.info/wp-content/uploads/CCU-report-proof3-for-23-May.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4R9N-BLWM] (indicating that new technologies, such as carbon 
capture and sequestration and direct air capture, are being developed and used to 
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Reducing global emissions, however, presents a classic collective 
action problem on a global scale because reducing emissions in only a 
single state or country will not address this global problem.123 Although 
it is in all countries’ collective interest to reduce global emissions due 
to climate change, it would be in each country’s individual self-interest 
to have other countries reduce their emissions to accomplish this goal 
without having to reduce their own emissions because of the perceived 
negative economic consequences associated with reducing emissions.124 
Indeed, the free rider effect associated with collective action problems 
arguably is the biggest impediment to achieving a global solution to 
climate change. Thus, addressing climate change currently is more of a 
political issue than a scientific one. 
At the center of the debate are concerns that emission reductions 
means energy cost hikes, negative economic growth, job losses, 
bureaucratic bloat, and governmental involvement in picking winners 
and losers among energy technologies.125 Of course, these economic 
arguments against reducing CO2 emissions ignore the economic costs 
of failing to do so — the price tag associated with increasing flood 
damage, violent storms, droughts, wildfires, etc.126 These short term 
economic concerns, however, have resulted in the United States balking 
since 1990 at formally entering any of the global treaties designed to 
address climate change — the United Nations Framework Convention 
of Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), the Kyoto Protocol, and even the 
Paris Agreement.127 The primary American argument against entering 
the Paris Agreement (which President Obama agreed to enter without 
Congressional ratification and from which President Trump withdrew) 
is that it required emission reductions from the United States while 
simultaneously allowing China, the United States’ largest economic 
competitor and the world’s largest CO2 emitter, to continue increasing 
the amount of its CO2 emissions until 2030.128  
 
remove CO2 from the atmosphere, but they currently are not removing the amounts of 
CO2 necessary to reverse climate change). 
 123 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 124 See, e.g., Andreas Duit, Patterns of Environmental Collective Action: Some Cross-
National Findings, 59 POL. STUD. 900 (2010) (investigating the effect of institutional 
structures and social capital on large-scale environmental collective action). 
 125 See, e.g., Robert Sussman, Designing the New Green Deal: Where’s the Sweet Spot?, 
49 ENVTL. L. REP. 10428, 10430, 10437-40 (2019) (describing the various obstacles to 
durable consensus-based climate policies). 
 126 See id. at 10438. 
 127 See id. at 10435-36. 
 128 Id. at 10440. 
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When and if there is enough political will for all of the world’s 
primary CO2 emitters to agree to reduce emissions, there are numerous 
ways a country can do so depending upon the source of the emissions 
at issue. In America, the primary sources of CO2 emissions are coal fired 
electrical power plants, vehicles, manufacturing operations, residential 
and commercial buildings, and the agricultural industry.129 The best 
way to deal with each of these sources is different. For example, cap and 
trade, where a specific amount of emissions is permitted for an industry 
as a whole, is an efficient means of reducing emissions associated with 
power plants.130 Carbon based power plants using coal and natural gas 
also can be, and have been, replaced with renewable energy sources 
such as wind, solar, and hydro.131 To encourage the use of renewable 
energy for emission sources such as vehicles, on the other hand, tailpipe 
emission standards and tax credits toward the purchase of emission free 
vehicles successfully reduces vehicle emissions.132 These are only 
examples of ways to reduce emissions, and it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to attempt to suggest a comprehensive solution to climate 
change for each of the various sources of emissions. 
The focus of this Article is on the wildfire crisis in America and 
climate change is only one aspect of that crisis. Indeed, once there is a 
global will to do so, it will still take decades for climate change to be 
halted or reversed.133 The American wildfire crisis, however, is 
occurring now. Consequently, America cannot wait for climate change 
solutions or global commitments from other countries in order to 
respond to the wildfire crisis. It must be addressed now and by 
American means. 
B. Reduce Wildfire Fuels 
One way of reducing the risk that catastrophic wildfires present is by 
reducing the chances of catastrophic wildfires occurring. Reducing fire 
fuel sources reduces the risk of catastrophic wildfires occurring. Fire 
 
 129 Id. at 10441-43. 
 130 Id. at 10445, 10449. 
 131 See id. at 10441. 
 132 See id. at 10445. 
 133 E.g., Is It Too Late to Prevent Climate Change?, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/ 
faq/16/is-it-too-late-to-prevent-climate-change/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/2BBZ-7TVU] (“Even if we stopped emitting greenhouse gases today, 
global warming would continue to happen for at least several more decades, if not 
centuries. That’s because it takes a while for the planet (for example, the oceans) to 
respond, and because carbon dioxide — the predominant heat-trapping gas — lingers 
in the atmosphere for hundreds of years.”). 
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fuel sources used to be reduced naturally by recurring low intensity 
fires.134 For example, in the California Sierra Forest, about 500,000 
acres of the forest used to burn annually due to lightning strike fires two 
hundred years ago, but under U.S. Forestry control since the early 
1900s, only about 33,000 acres have been burned annually.135 That 
needs to change. In recognition of this, reducing fire fuels has become 
a focus of the U.S. Forest Service and Congress in recent years.136 The 
U.S. Forest Services has been instructed to increase by threefold the 
amount of fire fuel it clears annually through controlled burns and 
selectively cutting down trees, as well as increasing timber 
production.137 In the past, the U.S. Forest Services had been forced to 
spend a lot of its budgetary money fighting wildfires instead of reducing 
the risk of wildfires.138 
C. Reduce or Eliminate Construction in the Wildland Urban Interface 
One of the reasons the property losses caused by wildfires in recent 
years have been catastrophic is because millions of people have been 
building and buying homes in the WUI where the risk of wildfire 
damage is the highest.139 So, another way of reducing property losses 
caused by wildfires is to reduce the number of homes being built in the 
WUI. State laws or local zoning ordinances can be used to address this 
issue. Such laws could prohibit people from building homes in areas at 
high risk for wildfires. Alternatively, as discussed in the next part, if that 
solution if not politically feasible due to the high cost of property in 
urban areas and the highly valued principle of individual freedom of 
choice regarding where to live, then state or local building codes could 
require that homes built in the WUI be fire resistant.140  
 
 134 See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 13, at 388. 
 135 See STRIKE FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8; Scott Wilson, Wet California Winter Is a 
Boon for Skiers and Water Supply. But It Brings a Threat: Wildfires., WASH. POST (June 17, 
2019, 10:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/wet-california-winter-is-a-
boon-for-skiers-and-water-supply-but-it-brings-a-threat-wildfires/2019/06/17/444acaa6-
8bb6-11e9-b08e-cfd89bd36d4e_story.html [https://perma.cc/4JJF-JABG]. 
 136 See supra note 15. 
 137 See supra note 15. 
 138 See Bona, supra note 15, at 1084. 
 139 See Barton, supra note 1, at 708-09 and accompanying text. 
 140 See, e.g., GAO-17-357 REPORT, supra note 38, at 45 (“A 2013 Forest Service study 
found that 91 percent of WUI residents interviewed in California, where defensible 
space ordinances are in place, have lowered fire risk by removing flammable vegetation 
from their properties.”). 
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D. Reduce the Risk of Homes Burning Through Building Codes 
The risk of homes burning in high-risk areas can be dramatically 
reduced if the homes are built to fire resistant standards.141 Fire resistant 
homes do not have flammable roofs or siding.142 They also have 
perimeters of 100 feet or more of non-flammable landscaping and 
outdoor spaces, which means no wooden fences, wooden decks, or 
other fire sources near the homes. In the dry and windy conditions often 
associated with wildfires, burning embers can travel long distances 
through the air, so vents also need to be covered to prevent burning 
embers from entering homes.143 Indeed, two-thirds of home losses are 
due to flying embers or low-intensity fires, as opposed to conflagrations 
overtaking the homes.144 Consequently, houses need a lengthy 
perimeter of fire resistant materials. So, for example, instead of using 
mulch around a house for landscaping, rock placed on top of landscape 
fabric can be used.  
In addition to being fire resistant, rock lasts longer than mulch and 
thus, it also would reduce maintenance costs and efforts. Indeed, studies 
have shown that the cost of building a “firewise” house is actually 
slightly lower than the cost of building a typical house.145 For homes 
already built, the cost of retrofitting the homes to firewise standards can 
be prohibitive for many homeowners,146 but homeowners can still 
reduce the risk of wildfires destroying their homes by removing as many 
flammable materials as possible from the perimeter of their homes. 
Numerous communities, such as San Diego, California and Flagstaff, 
Arizona, have recognized that making homes fire resistant is part of the 
solution to the wildfire crisis by adopting building codes that require 
the use of fire resistant materials on homes.147 And, since 2008, 
 
 141 See, e.g., id. at 33 (“Firewise, which encourages homeowners to take 
responsibility for their own properties by using fire resistant building materials and 
establishing defensible space, has helped reduce risk through community education.”). 
 142 See Barrett, supra note 14, at 21-22. 
 143 See QUARLES & POHL, supra note 2, at 8, 17, 21; GAO-17-357 REPORT, supra note 
38, at 12 (“Even structures not immediately adjacent to wildland vegetation can be 
vulnerable because wind can transport embers and ignite homes more than a mile from 
a fire.”). 
 144 QUARLES & POHL, supra note 2, at 8. 
 145 See id. at 2; see also Kaplan & Sellers, supra note 4. 
 146 See Kaplan & Sellers, supra note 4. 
 147 See Barrett, supra note 14, at 22-23. 
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California is one of only a few states to adopt laws mandating the use of 
fire resistant building materials in the WUI on a statewide basis.148  
Using building codes to require homeowners to build homes to resist 
natural disasters that impact the community has been proven to work 
in other contexts as well. For example, since Hurricane Andrew in 1992, 
Florida’s revised building codes have reduced losses from hurricanes by 
seventy-two percent.149 
IV. INSURING WILDFIRE LOSSES AND OTHER NATURAL CATASTROPHES 
A. The Importance of Insurance 
Private insurers should not be allowed to refuse to insure existing 
high-risk properties in the absence of an alternative insurance option 
because insurance plays a socially and financially critical role in 
developed countries such as America. Due to its critical social function 
of protecting the limited assets of individuals by spreading the risk of 
losses of individuals to large groups of people, insurance can be viewed 
as something more akin to a public financial instrument than a 
traditional contract between private parties.150 
 
 148 See QUARLES & POHL, supra note 2, at 7 (“Most states have not adopted a building 
code on a state-wide level, but rather have left local jurisdictions to decide whether and 
how to adopt such model codes as regulations. California is a notable exception, having 
adopted Materials and Construction Methods for Exterior Wildfire Exposure as Chapter 7A 
of the state building code in 2008.”); STRIKE FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14; 
Donahue, supra note 13, at 392 (“Only California, Colorado, and Oregon have statewide 
wildland-urban fire regulatory codes.”). 
 149 QUARLES & POHL, supra note 2, at 11. 
 150 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
653, 657 (2013) (describing the four conceptions of insurance, including the concept 
of insurance as a public utility/regulated industry); Christopher C. French, 
Understanding Insurance Policies as Non-Contracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting 
and Construing These Unique Financial Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 567-68 (2017) 
[hereinafter Understanding Insurance Policies] (arguing that the public policies 
insurance advances in ensuring compensation to victims and in transferring the risk of 
devastating losses from individuals to insurers are two of several reasons why insurance 
policies should not be treated as just contracts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy 
as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495-1513 
(2010) [hereinafter Social Instrument] (emphasizing the socially important role that 
insurance plays); Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral 
Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 26-29 (1999) (“Because virtually every adult citizen 
participates in various forms of mandatory insurance, from automobile liability 
insurance to unemployment insurance, old-age pensions and disability insurance, 
everyone is exposed to two of the moral assumptions of these programs: collective 
responsibility for the well-being of individuals and individual responsibility for the well-
being of others.”). 
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Homeowners insurance’s critical function today in developed 
countries is even more pronounced when one considers that 
homeowners insurance is effectively mandatory for most homeowners 
because anyone who needs to borrow money from a bank to purchase a 
house is required to have homeowners insurance as a prerequisite to 
obtaining a mortgage.151 Thus, because the majority of homeowners 
need to borrow money in order to purchase a house, homeowners 
insurance is effectively mandatory for most homeowners. If it is 
mandatory, then it needs to be available at an affordable cost because 
homeownership is a significant aspect of the American Dream.152 Yet, 
when left to the private insurance market, homeowners insurance is not 
available at an affordable price, or any price, for many natural 
catastrophes, including wildfires.153 
B. The Case for a Governmental Insurance Program to Cover Natural 
Catastrophes 
Through the risk-transferring mechanisms of reinsurance and 
catastrophe bonds, as well as the risk reduction techniques that 
homeowners and towns can take to minimize the chances of wildfires 
destroying homes and towns, one can argue that wildfires losses are not 
really correlated risks in the way that earthquakes and floods are such 
that private insurers cannot insure wildfire losses. Indeed, since 
property insurance first became available in America over 250 years ago 
for the very purpose of covering fire losses, private insurers have 
covered fire losses — whether caused by regular fires or wildfires.154  
Yet, wildfires do share many of the correlated risk characteristics that 
are associated with other natural catastrophes. If wildfires losses are 
treated as correlated risks and insurers do not have adequate insurance 
pool risk diversity, reinsurance, or catastrophe bond cover, then this 
 
 151 See MARTIN F. GRACE, ROBERT W. KLEIN, PAUL R. KLEINDORFER & MICHAEL R. 
MURRAY, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: CONSUMER DEMAND, MARKETS AND REGULATION 83 
(2003) (“[H]omeowners insurance . . . is essentially mandatory . . . .”); Stempel, Social 
Instrument, supra note 150, at 1497. 
 152 Alcynna Lloyd, NAR: American Dream of Homeownership Is Still Alive, HOUSING 
WIRE (Jan. 14, 2019, 1:30 PM), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/47907-nar-
american-dream-of-homeownership-is-still-alive/ [https://perma.cc/QEG7-6PGW] 
(“[A]pproximately 75% of non-homeowners and 90% of current homeowners said 
homeownership was essential to the American Dream.”). 
 153 See supra Part II.B. 
 154 See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 70, at 21 (describing how the oldest extant 
insurance company in the United States was used to compensate fire destruction losses); 
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 65, at 18 (describing the first development of accident 
and life insurance in early America).  
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raises the specter of insurer insolvencies when wildfires occur such as 
the insurer insolvency that recently occurred in connection with the 
Camp Fire.155 This weighs against private insurers covering the risk of 
wildfires. 
Another factor that weighs against the current regime of private 
insurers covering wildfires is the fact that there generally has been 
market failure when it comes to private companies insuring natural 
catastrophes. Natural catastrophes currently are significantly 
underinsured in America. In 2018, for example, there were 
approximately $82 billion in losses caused by natural catastrophes, 
including $25.4 billion attributed to wildfires, heat waves and drought, 
but approximately 40 percent of those losses were not covered by 
insurance.156 That means there is a significant underinsurance problem 
in America for natural catastrophes. This is unsurprising when one 
considers that flood damage is excluded under homeowners insurance 
sold by private insurers and only approximately five million of the 
seventy two million homeowners in America have purchased 
standalone flood insurance that is underwritten by the federal 
government.157 It also is unsurprising when one consider the prevalence 
of underinsured homes in wildfire risk areas.158 One solution to the 
market failure problem associated with insuring natural catastrophes 
would be for the federal government or state governments to assume 
the primary role of insuring natural catastrophe losses, including 
wildfire losses.159  
 
 155 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 156 See Facts + Statistics: U.S. Catastrophes, supra note 9. 
 157 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS AND AFFORDABILITY 1 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/ 
115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53028-nfipreport2.pdf [https://perma.cc/A592-NR8S] 
(analyzing the five million insurance policies that cover flooding); Sample Homeowners 
Policy, Section I — Exclusions, § A.3, in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND 
REGULATION 206 (5th ed. 2010) (reproducing the policy containing the flood 
exclusion); Christopher C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most Common and Devastating 
Natural Catastrophes in America, 60 VILL. L. REV. 53, 71 (2015) [hereinafter Insuring 
Floods] (explaining that only 5.5 million of the seventy-two million homeowners in 
America in 2012 had flood insurance). 
 158 See supra Part II.B. 
 159 Ideally, the federal government would sponsor the natural catastrophe insurance 
program contemplated in this Article because it would allow for the pool of insureds to 
span the entire country. This would allow for the largest pool of insureds possible in 
America with the most diverse risk profiles. Although some states, such as Texas, are 
large enough and face a variety of natural catastrophe perils, such as flooding, 
hurricanes and wildfires, to allow for a robust pool of insureds with diverse risk profiles, 
in many states that would not be the case. Consequently, the risk of substantial 
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A governmental entity arguably is better able to insure natural 
catastrophes than private insurance companies. First, the managers of 
private insurance companies often cannot take a long-term view 
regarding profitability because they are owned by shareholders who 
demand quarterly and annual profits. This can be a problem when it 
comes to insuring correlated natural catastrophe risks because private 
insurers almost inevitably incur short term losses following a natural 
catastrophe.160 Second, the tax laws effectively discourage private 
insurance companies from accumulating the large amounts of cash 
necessary to pay catastrophic losses in the future because the income 
generated by cash that is set aside to pay future losses is taxed.161 Third, 
companies with large amounts of accumulated cash, which an insurer 
must have in order to pay losses associated with correlated natural 
catastrophe losses, become attractive takeover targets for investors 
because many people believe that idle cash can and should be deployed 
for more financially rewarding purposes.162 Fourth, insurers ironically 
are not permitted under the current accounting rules to create reserves 
for the payment of future claims if the events giving rise to the claims 
(e.g., the actual wildfires) have not yet occurred.163 Consequently, these 
laws collectively discourage private insurance companies from retaining 
the large amounts of cash necessary to cover correlated natural 
catastrophe losses that occur infrequently, but require large cash outlays 
when they do occur.164  
 
premium subsidization by low-risk insureds of high-risk insureds could be a problem if 
the state sponsored a natural catastrophe program in such states. See, e.g., Omri Ben-
Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 STAN. 
L. REV. 571, 596 (2016) [hereinafter Subsidized Weather Insurance] (finding that the 
premiums charged to coastal properties are subsidized by inland properties). 
 160 See, e.g., FAIR Plan Report, supra note 88, at 10 (“The underwriting experience 
between 2001 and 2017 illustrates that an extended period of underwriting profits can 
be wiped out by a very large wildfire or other catastrophic event (a fire following an 
earthquake, for example). Underwriting profits in the Homeowners Multiple Peril and 
Fire lines totaled $12.1 billion from 2001 through 2016 combined, and were almost 
completely wiped out by the results for 2017.” (quoting DIXON ET AL., THE IMPACT OF 
CHANGING WILDFIRE RISK, supra note 39, at 55)). 
 161 See Cummins, supra note 22, at 371-72; Jaffee & Russell, supra note 94, at 212. 
 162 See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 94, at 212-13. 
 163 Cummins, supra note 22, at 371-72; Jaffee & Russell, supra note 94, at 209 
(discussing Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) Statement No. 5 
Accounting for Contingencies, which precludes an insurance company from 
earmarking capital surplus to pay for future catastrophic losses that have not yet 
occurred). 
 164 See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 94, at 212. 
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A governmental insurance program, on the other hand, would not be 
incentivized to be undercapitalized. First, it would not be required to 
be subject to the same tax and accounting laws as private companies, so 
it would be in a better position to hold the large amount of idle cash 
needed to cover infrequent natural catastrophe losses.165 Second, a 
governmental insurance program would not have shareholders 
demanding a return on their investments in the form of dividends or 
stock repurchases every quarter. Third, a governmental insurance 
program would not be a takeover target for private investors because, as 
a government program, it would not be available for purchase. Fourth, 
unlike private companies that would need to sell more shares of stock 
or issue bonds if it becomes necessary to raise additional capital to pay 
losses related to correlated natural catastrophe losses, the government 
has access to additional capital post-loss through its taxing power.166 In 
short, many of the reasons that private insurers currently are poorly 
suited to insuring natural catastrophe risks would not apply to a 
governmental insurance program. 
Another option for addressing the market failure that currently exists 
regarding insuring natural catastrophes would be for the government to 
act as a reinsurer for private insurers for losses that exceed a certain 
stated amount for any individual insurer. An advantage to that approach 
would be that it keeps private insurers as participants in the insurance 
market and it would allow for a competitive market for natural 
catastrophe insurance.  
Of course, for the government as reinsurer approach to work, 
coverage for natural catastrophes would either need to be mandatory 
under property policies or the reinsurance attachment point would need 
to be low enough to induce private insurers to offer the coverage. This 
is exactly what the federal government has done with respect to 
coverage for terrorism losses. Since insurers attempted to exclude 
coverage for terrorism losses following 9/11, the federal government 
stepped into the void and has been providing reinsurance to private 
insurers for terrorism losses and requiring insurers to at least offer 
 
 165 Government insurance programs are subject to whatever accounting rules and 
laws the legislators creating the programs designate. As an example of a government 
insurance program that is not subject to the same tax laws as private insurance 
companies, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund is exempt from federal income tax. 
Cole et al., supra note 75, at 268 n.3. 
 166 See id. at 267-68. 
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coverage for such losses.167 The federal government, or state 
governments, could do so for natural catastrophe losses as well. Of 
course, with respect to the risk of wildfire losses, the devil would be in 
the details with respect to defining the difference between a wildfire loss 
that would be covered by natural catastrophe insurance and a regular 
fire loss that would be covered by traditional homeowners insurance. 
A governmental insurance program that covers natural catastrophes 
also would be a logical extension of the government’s current role with 
respect to insurance. The insurance industry already is highly regulated 
because of public policy and social concerns regarding the protection of 
powerless consumers and to ensure that innocent victims are 
compensated for their injuries. For example, insurers currently are 
regulated by the states with respect to the policy language contained in 
their policy forms, the premium rates they can charge, and the amounts 
of capital surplus they must maintain.168 States also already manage 
guarantee associations that cover insurance claims submitted to 
insolvent insurers, and states already have residual risk insurance 
programs for automobile drivers who private insurers refuse to accept 
as customers.169 Some states, such as California, also have similar 
residual risk insurance plans — e.g., the FAIR Plan — for property 
owners who cannot obtain homeowners insurance from private 
insurers.170  
There are numerous reasons the insurance industry is already heavily 
regulated. One, the purchase of some lines of insurance, such as 
automobile and homeowners, are essentially mandatory, yet insureds 
play no role in the creation of the terms and conditions of insurance 
policies. To the contrary, insurance policies are complex, 
incomprehensible documents created by insurers and then sold on a 
take it or leave it basis to consumers who are required to purchase the 
 
 167 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Michelle E. Boardman, 
Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 787-89 (2005). 
 168 See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 119, 126-28, 142-46; JERRY & 
RICHMOND, supra note 65, at 89-94. 
 169 See ABRAHAM, supra note 157, at 771; ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 
122-23; see also Spencer L. Kimball & Noreen J. Parrett, Creation of the Guaranty 
Association System, 19 J. INS. REG. 259, 262 (2000). 
 170 See supra Part II. 
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product.171 Consequently, states need to provide regulatory oversight to 
prevent insurers from abusing their dominant position.172 
Two, insurers also commonly use the same policy forms, so there is 
an anticompetitive aspect to the insurance industry.173 Yet, the industry 
is exempted from federal antitrust laws.174 Consequently, the 
government needs to police the language in the policy forms to ensure 
that it is not unreasonably one-sided in favor of insurers.175 
Three, when a person buys an insurance policy, in exchange for the 
payment of a premium, the purchaser receives nothing except a promise 
by the insurer to pay in the future in the event of a loss. Consumers 
need some governmental assurance that an insurer that takes their 
money today in exchange for a promise to pay in the distant future will 
be solvent when the time comes for the insurer to make good on its 
promise.176  
Four, public policy and social concerns regarding the compensation 
of innocent victims are also significant factors with respect to insurance 
matters. In the liability context, for example, most injuries caused by 
other people would go uncompensated in the absence of insurance 
 
 171 See, e.g., 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON 
INSURANCE COVERAGE § 4.06[b] (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2020); Michelle Boardman, 
Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) 
(describing the “hyperstandardization” of insurance policies); James M. Fischer, Why 
Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“[T]here is little, if any, freedom to negotiate the 
standardized language of the insurance contract that determines the scope of 
coverage.”); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 
(2007) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical 
coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating 
Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1270-73 (2011) (discussing the 
history of standardized insurance policies); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are 
standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to 
bargain around.”). 
 172 See French, Understanding Insurance Policies, supra note 150, at 552. 
 173 See, e.g., Randall, supra note 171, at 125 (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all 
insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”). 
 174 E.g., Abraham, supra note 150, at 669; Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, 
Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders’ Objectively Reasonable Expectations of 
Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 401 (1998); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 
(2018); Fischer, supra note 171, at 1054-55; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the 
“Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 
807, 826 (1993). 
 175 See, e.g., French, Understanding Insurance Policies, supra note 150, at 552. 
 176 See id. 
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because most people in America are judgment proof.177 That, of course, 
means that, in the absence of insurance, many injured people would not 
be able to pay their medical bills or recover lost wages. These are the 
primary reasons that automobile insurance is mandatory — to ensure 
that automobile accident victims’ losses are paid.178 These same 
concerns apply with respect to catastrophic property losses that private 
insurers refuse to insure. In the absence of a governmental insurance 
program or a government bailout, most homeowners are financially 
devastated when an uninsured natural catastrophe destroys their 
homes.179  
Having a governmental insurance program for natural catastrophes 
also would be a more transparent, less ad hoc system for government 
payments to individuals for natural catastrophe losses. Currently, 
without any established rules or policy terms, the federal government 
de facto plays the role of insurer of last resort with respect to natural 
catastrophes for some people due to government bailouts. For example, 
through ad hoc legislation, the federal government has paid 
approximately $300 billion for the natural catastrophe losses associated 
with Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, and Harvey.180 Creating a formal 
 
 177 See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
603, 606 (2006) (discussing the reasons why judgments against most people are 
uncollectible); Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 
1375-76 (1994) (discussing the impact insurance has on the judgment-proof problem); 
S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 47-52, 55 n.1 (1986) 
(analyzing the problems that result from judgment-proof individuals). 
 178 See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 65, at 924-25 (stating that the obvious 
purpose of mandatory auto insurance is to provide victims of automobile accidents with 
access to funds to cover their losses); Stempel, Social Instrument, supra note 150, at 
1497-98 (noting that every state effectively requires auto insurance in order to license 
a car). 
 179 See, e.g., Sanjay Bhatt, Slide Erased Their Homes, but Maybe Not Their Loans, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2014, 9:29 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/latestnews/ 
2023278858_mudslidefinancialxml.html [https://perma.cc/XR8Z-546R] (“If [the Oso 
Landslide victims] can’t get adequate relief on their mortgages . . . they may pursue 
bankruptcy to get rid of the debt.”); Becky Johnson, Landslide Hazard Maps Axed by 
State: Risky Slopes in Jackson, Haywood to Remain a Mystery for Now, SMOKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS (June 29, 2011), http://www.smokymountainnews.com/news/item/4292-
landslide-hazard-maps-axed-by-state-risky-slopes-in-jackson-haywood-to-remain-a-
mystery-for-now [https://perma.cc/9ZHT-CUJX] (“Regular homeowners insurance 
doesn’t cover landslides. Homeowners are out of luck — whether a home is totally 
flattened or the foundation destabilized due to shifting soil. They can’t sell their home, 
nor will insurance compensate them. Meanwhile, they have to keep paying the mortgage 
on a house they can’t live in. Often, bankruptcy and foreclosure become the only 
option.”). 
 180 See Sami Sparber, Trump Signs Off on Nearly $90 Billion of Disaster Funding that 
Will Help Harvey Victims, DAILY TEXAN (Feb. 16, 2018, 12:15 AM), 
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governmental insurance program would make the process regarding 
how natural catastrophe losses are funded and paid more transparent. 
For the victims of natural catastrophes, such a program also would 
make it more predictable whether their losses will be paid and would 
require less political maneuvering regarding the passage of bailout bills 
when natural catastrophes occur.  
Finally, although the creation of a governmental insurance program 
for natural catastrophes may sound revolutionary, it really is just 
evolutionary. There already are numerous other governmental 
insurance programs in America, including social security disability 
insurance, unemployment insurance, and Medicare/Medicaid. The 
natural catastrophe insurance contemplated in this Article would 
simply be another governmental line of insurance that would be sold 
separate from traditional homeowners policies and it is not intended to 
replace traditional homeowners policies or to cover the non-correlated 
risks that currently are covered by homeowners insurance. 
C. The Case for “Bundled” Insurance Instead of Standalone Insurance 
for Specific Natural Catastrophes 
Although a governmental insurance program to cover wildfires 
conceptually may be sound, how such a program is structured could be 
the difference between a successful program and an unsuccessful one. 
Creating a governmental insurance program that sells a standalone 
policy that covers just wildfire losses would be a mistake. A better 
approach would be to insure wildfires as part of bundled coverage 
because of the numerous problems associated with standalone 
insurance that only covers a single natural catastrophe peril.  
Three of the biggest problems with standalone insurance programs 
that cover only a single natural catastrophe peril are: (1) adverse 
selection, (2) high premiums, and (3) low take up rates. The first two 
problems are closely related, and all three problems can be addressed 
by bundling the perils covered by the insurance into a single policy.  
Adverse selection theory posits that a person who thinks his house 
may be damaged by a wildfire because he lives near a dry forest in 




Ryan Sruyk, What Past Federal Hurricane Aid Tells Us About Money for Harvey Recovery, 
CNN POL. (Sept. 7, 2017, 11:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/31/politics/ 
hurricane-harvey-recovery-money/index.html [https://perma.cc/XZ6E-QEJR] (noting 
that more than $200 billion in federal aid was paid for recovery from Hurricanes Katrina 
and Sandy). 
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purchase wildfire insurance than someone who lives in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, which gets some type of precipitation at least twice a 
week year round.181 Consequently, adverse selection is a serious 
concern with respect to standalone insurance. Only the people at the 
highest risk will likely buy it. 
The risk of adverse selection diminishes, however, if coverage for all 
the most common types of natural catastrophes are bundled together in 
the same policy. For example, if policies for natural catastrophes were 
to cover losses for the various natural catastrophes such as wildfires, 
flooding, hurricanes, and landslides, then a person who lives in 
California, Washington, Oregon, or Colorado and is concerned about 
wildfires would not have a greater incentive to purchase the policy than 
a person who lives in Pittsburgh and is more concerned about flooding 
and landslides. Thus, if the policyholder wants to, or is required to, have 
insurance to cover any of the potential losses covered under a bundled 
natural catastrophe policy, then she would buy the policy regardless of 
whether she thinks she needs coverage for all of the perils covered by 
the policy. This, in turn, means the program would have a diverse pool 
of insureds who are not all exposed to the same types and level of risk 
(i.e., the insureds’ risks would not be correlated). 
The second problem with standalone insurance — high premium 
prices — is also due to adverse selection. Because the people most likely 
to buy standalone insurance are also the people most likely to suffer 
losses, the premiums charged to those people necessarily need to be 
higher than for an average risk person in order for the premium rates 
for the program to be actuarially sound. Consequently, if only the 
highest risk people buy the insurance, then high premiums must be 
charged. 
To illustrate the problems with standalone insurance for a single 
natural catastrophe peril, consider the National Flood Insurance 
Program (“NFIP”). It is as an example of a failing insurance program. 
The NFIP is a federally backed insurance program that was created in 
the 1960s when private insurers generally began excluding coverage in 
property policies for flood losses because flood losses are viewed as 
correlated risks.182  
 
 181 See, e.g., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, BESTPLACES, https://www.bestplaces.net/ 
climate/city/pennsylvania/pittsburgh (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) [https://perma.cc/YR2S-
DCNC] (providing information on rain weather patterns in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). 
 182 See, e.g., French, Insuring Floods, supra note 157, at 61 (explaining how insurers 
decided they did not want to cover flood losses); Kriesel & Landry, supra note 8, at 405 
(providing further explanation about the National Flood Insurance Program). 
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NFIP policies are expensive even though many of them are sold at 
subsidized premium rates. As of August 31, 2016, the high end of the 
median premium range for an NFIP policy that covers only flood losses 
was $1,330.183 The insurance industry, however, has projected that the 
premium rates would be twice that amount if the NFIP were actuarially 
sound and the insurance were sold by private insurers.184 The premium 
rates need to be high in order for the program to be actuarially sound 
because many of the properties being insured are the ones at the highest 
risk for flood losses.185 In 2012, in an attempt to make the program 
fiscally sound, the program was amended under the Biggert-Waters 
Flood Insurance Reform Act to require property owners to pay 
actuarially sound premium rates, but the amendments were never fully 
implemented due to the subsequent political resistance from states 
frequently impacted by flooding because the actuarially sound premium 
rates were viewed as unaffordable for many people.186 Consequently, 
subsidized, but high, premium rates have continued and the NFIP has 
been bankrupt for many years with periodic capital infusions from 
taxpayers to keep it going.187 The program currently is running a deficit 
of more than $20 billion.188 
And, in exchange for an expensive but still subsidized premium, little 
insurance coverage is provided by a NFIP policy. Personal property is 
covered at “actual cash” value instead of replacement cost, which means 
property owners receive pennies on the dollar for destroyed personal 
property.189 Further, most items in a house’s basement are not covered, 
and the maximum coverage provided for the entire house is capped at 
 
 183 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 157, at 2. 
 184 See Vivien Lee & David Wessel, The Hutchins Center Explains: National Flood 
Insurance Program, BROOKINGS (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2017/10/10/the-hutchins-center-explains-national-flood-insurance-program/ 
[https://perma.cc/79C2-UTBH]. 
 185 See id. 
 186 See id.; John McAneney, Delphine McAneney, Rade Musulin, George Walker & 
Ryan Crompton, Government-Sponsored Natural Disaster Insurance Pools: A View from 
Down-Under, 15 INT’L J. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 1, 6 (2016). 
 187 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-157SP, HIGH-RISK SERIES: 
SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE GREATER PROGRESS ON HIGH-RISK AREAS 272 
(2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697245.pdf [https://perma.cc/8854-UFX7] 
(“As of September 2018, FEMA’s debt stood at $20.5 billion despite Congress having 
canceled $16 billion in debt in October 2017. Without reforms, the financial condition 
of NFIP could continue to worsen.”). 
 188 See id. 
 189 See 42 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(2)-(3) (2018); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
FEMA F–679, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: SUMMARY OF COVERAGE 3 (2012). 
  
2020] America on Fire 857 
$250,000, which does not cover the cost to replace many homes in 
America.190  
The third problem with standalone policies, such as NFIP policies, is 
that very few people actually buy them, either due to ignorance 
regarding the risk they are facing or because the premium rates are 
unaffordable.191 Only about ten percent of the victims of Hurricane 
Katrina and a little over fifty percent of Hurricane Sandy victims had 
flood insurance even though people who live in areas surrounded by 
water, like New Orleans and New York City, are people who obviously 
should be concerned about flooding.192 In fact, of the approximately 
seventy-two million homeowners in America, only about five million 
have flood insurance.193 If they are not required by their banks to 
purchase flood insurance, very few people purchase it.194 So, offering 
standalone insurance for specific natural catastrophes simply does not 
work very well on a nationwide basis. 
In contrast, by including coverage for natural catastrophes in a 
bundled policy, the pool of insureds would be much more diverse with 
different risk levels for each of the various perils they face. This, in turn, 
could allow for more affordable premium rates because the rates would 
be based upon the risk for all the covered perils, not just the single peril 
the homeowner is at the highest risk of facing.  
In addition, the take up rates by homeowners would be much higher 
(e.g., much closer to seventy million than five million) because 
homeowners insurance already is effectively mandatory for most people 
due to the banking requirements previously discussed.195 Thus, the 
number of uninsured people who would need a government bailout 
following a natural catastrophe should be dramatically reduced. And, 
instead of simply receiving a government handout after a loss, 
homeowners affected by natural catastrophes would be paying 
premiums to at least partially offset their loss payments, as insureds do 
under all other types of insurance programs. 
 
 190 See 42 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(2)-(3); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 189, at 
3; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-297R, OVERVIEW OF GAO’S PAST WORK 
ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 3 (2014) [hereinafter GAO-14-297R 
REPORT]; French, Insuring Floods, supra note 157, at 67. 
 191 See, e.g., French, Insuring Floods, supra note 157, at 70-71. 
 192 Id. at 53. 
 193 E.g., id. at 71; see, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 157, at 3. 
 194 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, Subsidized Weather Insurance, supra note 159, at 
619 (“[O]nly twenty-one percent of homeowners in high-flood-risk areas in New York 
City who are not subject to a flood insurance mandate under their mortgage contract 
actually purchase flood insurance, even at subsidized rates.”). 
 195 See supra Part IV.A. 
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D. The Case Against a Governmental Insurance Program for Natural 
Catastrophes 
Although there are many arguments in favor of governmental 
insurance programs for natural catastrophes, there are, of course, also 
several arguments against governmental insurance programs. One 
problem with a government insurance program is that some lower risk 
insureds inevitably will subsidize higher risk insureds unless each 
insured is charged an actuarially sound premium.196 And, if everyone is 
charged an actuarially sound premium, then some, or even many, high-
risk insureds might not be able to afford the insurance, which is one of 
the problems the NFIP faces. The response to that criticism is that all 
insurance programs, including “private insurance pools[,] involve some 
cross-subsidization from the less risky to the more risky.”197 Some 
subsidization of premium rates is simply an aspect of insurance pools 
because risks can only be measured with approximate levels of 
accuracy. Moreover, when it comes to insuring natural catastrophe 
losses in developed countries, a certain amount of solidarity among 
citizens is simply an aspect of citizenship. With that said, the intention 
is that the insurance program as a whole would be actuarially sound so 
taxpayers would no longer need to fund natural catastrophe losses for 
the uninsured or underinsured in the form of government bailouts. 
Government bailouts are financed by all taxpayers, not just 
homeowners, so bailouts result in some people who pay taxes, but 
cannot afford to own a home, subsidizing wealthier homeowners’ losses.  
Consequently, under a natural catastrophe insurance program, 
because the premium-paying pool of insureds would be limited to 
homeowners, poorer non-homeowners would not be subsidizing 
wealthier homeowners. And, the amount of premium subsidization of 
high-risk insureds by lower risk insureds should be quite modest 
because the amounts are being spread across such a large number of 
insureds with diverse risk profiles spread across the country.198 Further, 
 
 196 Many people may not realize that they already are subsidizing flood losses even 
though they do not have flood insurance. The NFIP currently is receiving billions of 
dollars of taxpayer subsidies even though most people do not have flood insurance. See 
Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Increasing the Nation’s 
Resilience: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th 
Cong. 3-4 (2014) (statement of Mark Gaffigan, Managing Director, Nat Res. & Env’t), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660860.pdf [https://perma.cc/TVY7-Q8QE]. Further, 
each government bailout of property owners in areas devastated by natural catastrophes 
such as Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy and Harvey are another form of public subsidization 
of individuals’ losses. 
 197 Ben-Shahar & Logue, Subsidized Weather Insurance, supra note 159, at 593. 
 198 See supra Part IV. 
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the premium rates largely would be based upon home values, so 
wealthier people would pay higher premium rates.  
In 2018, for example, there were approximately $82 billion in natural 
catastrophe losses in America.199 If that loss were spread equally across 
seventy million homeowners without taking into account home values, 
then the loss per home would be approximately $1171. If home values 
were factored into the premium rates, then the owners of more 
expensive homes effectively would bear much more of the losses than 
the owners of average or low-priced homes because the wealthier 
homeowners would be paying higher premium rates based upon the 
higher values of their homes.  
Another problem with a government insurance program is that there 
inevitably would be political opposition by certain segments of society 
to the creation of such a program because government sponsored 
insurance could be characterized as a form of socialism by anyone who 
is paying more than an actuarially sound premium rate. The reality, of 
course, is that America already has several governmental insurance 
programs that have socialist aspects to them. For example, Social 
Security Disability Insurance has been a federal insurance program 
since 1956.200 The program provides financial assistance to people who 
are unable to work due to a long-term mental or physical disability, and 
over ten million Americans annually receive benefits under the program 
regardless of whether they paid actuarially sound amounts into the 
program.201 The program primarily is funded through payroll and self-
employment taxes.202  
Another example of an existing governmental insurance program 
where lower risk insureds subsidize higher risk insureds’ insurance 
premium rates can be found in Florida. A significant provider of 
homeowners insurance in Florida is Citizens Property Insurance 
Corporation (“Citizens”), a state-sponsored program.203 Under the 
program, the premium rates charged to coastal residents are subsidized 
by inland residents to some extent.204 Citizens historically also has sold 
 
 199 See Facts + Statistics: U.S. Catastrophes, supra note 9. 
 200 See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2018). 
 201 See Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Jobless Tap Disability Fund, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 28, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020429680457712 
1392750460030 [https://perma.cc/P9UK-GHK9]. 
 202 See 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2018). 
 203 See Cole et al., supra note 75, at 269. 
 204 See id. at 280. Ben-Shahar and Logue are critical of Citizens because the premium 
subsidization is a regressive redistribution of wealth in that affluent homeowners’ 
premium rates for coastal homes are being subsidized by less affluent inland 
homeowners’ premium rates. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, Subsidized Weather Insurance, 
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property insurance to many homeowners in Florida to cover hurricane 
damage at premium rates significantly lower than private insurers.205 It 
has been able to do so for many of the reasons discussed in Part IV.B of 
this Article: (1) it does not need to provide adequate quarterly and 
annual returns to investors; (2) it is tax exempt; (3) it does not need to 
raise excessive capital to pre-fund losses because it has the ability to do 
post-loss assessments; and (4) it is reinsured by a state-sponsored 
reinsurer, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.206 Although some 
scholars are critical of Citizens due to the subsidized premium rates for 
coastal properties,207 because of the existence of Citizens, homeowners 
in Florida have been able to procure property insurance and remain 
homeowners despite private insurers fleeing the state after devastating 
hurricanes caused insurer losses.208  
With that said, under the nationwide bundled natural catastrophe 
insurance program that is being proposed in this Article, the cross 
subsidization of higher risk insureds, such as coastal properties, by 
lower risk insureds should be far less than what has occurred in Florida 
because of the much larger, more diverse risk pool of insureds and the 
premium rates primarily would be based upon home values. Thus, 
expensive homes would be charged higher premium rates than less 
expensive homes. Moreover, even if there were a minor free rider effect 
by affluent homeowners, that negative consequence would not 
outweigh the positive effect of providing homeowners insurance for 
natural catastrophes to millions of homeowners who otherwise would 
be uninsured, as they currently are, due to the unavailability of 
insurance — either private or government-sponsored — for natural 
catastrophes. 
 
supra note 159, at 596, 608. Regressive redistribution of wealth through premium 
subsidization should not be a significant problem under the natural catastrophe 
insurance program proposed in this Article because the insurance pool would include 
a larger number of insureds with diverse risk profiles and premiums would be primarily 
based upon the insured homes’ values. Consequently, affluent homeowners would be 
charged much higher premium rates than poorer people. 
 205 See Cole et al., supra note 75, at 269. 
 206 See id. at 267-71. 
 207 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, Subsidized Weather Insurance, supra note 159, at 
608 (stating that people who live in wealthier zip codes receive larger subsidies); Martin 
Grace & Robert Klein, The Perfect Storm: Hurricanes, Insurance, and Regulation, 12 RISK 
MGMT. & INS. REV. 81, 113 (2009) (noting that the shortfalls are covered by assessments 
on insurance consumers and state general funds). 
 208 See 1993 Fla. Laws 2881 (law temporarily barred insurers from exiting the 
Florida property insurance market following Hurricane Andrew in 1992); Butler, supra 
note 94, at 769-70 (discussing Florida’s statute banning private insurers from the 
property insurance market). 
  
2020] America on Fire 861 
Other people will also argue that America needs less governmental 
involvement with private industries, not more. That argument, 
however, is not very strong when it comes to the insurance industry. 
The insurance industry already is heavily regulated for the public policy 
and social reasons discussed in Parts IV.A and IV.B.209 The insurance 
industry needs to be regulated due to the nature of its business and the 
critical importance it plays. 
Other people will argue that covering natural catastrophe losses 
under a governmental insurance program would create a moral hazard 
problem for homeowners. Moral hazard theory posits that: (1) a person 
who has insurance may be incentivized to destroy the insured property 
in order to collect the insurance proceeds, and/or (2) a person will take 
less care to avoid losses if the losses are insured.210 Applied in the 
context of wildfires, the theory hypothesizes that the existence of 
insurance would encourage people to build homes and live in areas 
prone to wildfires. And, because they have insurance, homeowners 
 
 209 See supra Parts IV.A, IV.B; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STATE INSURANCE 
REGULATION 2 (2011), https://www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_hist_ins_ 
reg.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EKT-T88K] (“Insurance is more heavily regulated than other 
types of business because of the complexity of the insurance contracts, the lack of 
sufficient information for insurance consumers to adequately shop for prices and 
adequacy of coverage and because insurance contracts are generally contracts of 
adhesion.”). 
 210 See, e.g., W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 
1985) (“Once a person has insurance, he will take more risks than before because he 
bears less of the cost of his conduct.”); MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 480 (8th ed. 2005) (The term “moral hazard” also 
generally encompasses situations where “[a] person . . . deliberately causes a loss . . . 
[or] exaggerates the size of a claim to defraud an insurer.”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra 
note 65, at 12 (“[T]he existence of insurance can have the perverse effect of increasing 
the probability of loss. . . . This phenomenon is called moral hazard.”); Scott E. 
Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
INSURANCE ECONOMICS: READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 626, 631 (George Dionne 
& Scott Harrington eds., 1992) (“Moral hazard is the tendency for the presence and 
characteristics of insurance coverage to produce inefficient changes in buyers’ loss 
prevention activities, including carelessness and fraud . . . .”); George L. Priest, The 
Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) (“Moral 
hazard refers to the effect of the existence of insurance itself on the level of insurance 
claims made by the insured. . . . Ex ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions 
taken by the insured to prevent the loss, because of the existence of insurance.”); Adam 
F. Scales, The Chicken and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The Liability Century,” 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2008) (Moral hazard is the term used to describe the phenomenon 
that a person will have a “tendency to take fewer precautions in the presence of 
insurance.”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 n.117 (1990) (“‘Moral hazard’ is sometimes distinguished 
from ‘morale hazard,’ the former referring to deliberate acts like arson, the latter to the 
mere relaxation of the defendant’s discipline of carefulness.”). 
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would not bother to take steps, such as creating a fire-resistant zone 
around their houses, to minimize the risk of their homes being burned 
to the ground. Some scholars have made this same argument in the 
context of hurricanes, arguing that the existence of homeowners 
insurance at subsidized premium rates encourages people to build in 
dangerous coastal areas largely to the benefit of the affluent at the 
expense of poorer people.211 
These moral hazard arguments have theoretical appeal and may 
impact buying decisions of homeowners on the margins if the premium 
prices are unaffordable or insurance is completely unavailable, but 
moral hazard arguments are counterintuitive in the context of wildfires. 
Such arguments also have been proven to be empirically false in other 
natural catastrophe contexts as well.212  
Intuition suggests that most people would prefer to avoid the 
inconvenience of becoming homeless and having all their worldly 
possessions destroyed in a fire even if an insurer ultimately will pay for 
most of the loss months later. Insurance proceeds also cannot replace 
sentimental items, such as family heirlooms and old photos. 
Further, the moral hazard argument is based upon the false premise 
that affluent people build in beautiful areas prone to natural 
catastrophes because of the availability of subsidized insurance and that 
the availability of this insurance benefits the affluent more than poorer 
people. The people who would most benefit from natural catastrophe 
insurance are the less affluent regardless of whether some affluent 
homeowners also would receive some nominal premium subsidization 
from lower risk insureds. There at least three reasons for this: (1) 
natural catastrophes impact many more poor people than affluent 
people because poorer people tend to live in areas more prone to natural 
catastrophes and their homes are not built as well to withstand 
damage,213 (2) poorer people cannot move away from dangerous areas 
 
 211 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, Subsidized Weather Insurance, supra note 159, at 
616 (arguing homeowners have been attracted to live in high-risk coastal areas due, in 
part, to subsidized premium rates under the NFIP). The article does not cite any 
empirical evidence to support this argument beyond the fact that population growth 
and development along the coast has continued since the NFIP was created in the 1960s. 
This is a classic example of mistaking correlation for causation. Population growth and 
development has occurred across the country, in flood risk areas and in non-flood risk 
areas. How many fewer, if any, properties would have been built along the coast in the 
absence of NFIP insurance is unknown. 
 212 See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 213 See Eleanor Krause & Richard V. Reeves, Hurricanes Hit the Poor the Hardest, 
BROOKINGS (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2017/ 
09/18/hurricanes-hit-the-poor-the-hardest/ [https://perma.cc/MJ56-S5PJ] (“Low-income 
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as easily as wealthier people,214 and (3) most poor people currently are 
completely uninsured for natural catastrophes.215 So, the benefit to 
poorer people of having insurance, as opposed to being uninsured, 
when a natural catastrophe strikes is obvious regardless of whether the 
affluent also would be aided by the insurance or receive some nominal 
premium subsidization from less risky homeowners. 
People have been living in areas that are now prone to natural 
catastrophes long before the areas became prone to natural catastrophes 
and without regard to whether the areas would be considered attractive 
areas to live by the affluent. That is one of the consequences of climate 
change — the areas impacted by natural catastrophes have increased 
and the severity of the natural catastrophes has increased regardless of 
whether the areas are considered beautiful or how affluent the 
homeowners living there are.216 
 
and minority communities are more vulnerable to the risks of natural disasters, and they also 
struggle most to recover. . . . [L]ower income Americans are more likely to live in 
neighborhoods or buildings more susceptible to storm shocks.”); Annie Lowrey, What the 
Camp Fire Revealed, ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ 
archive/2019/01/why-natural-disasters-are-worse-poor/580846/ [https://perma.cc/Z9KE-
YSE2] (“In California, the extremely high cost of housing has encouraged building in and 
migration to certain fire-prone areas. This is to say: The country’s built landscape means that 
lower-income families are often the most vulnerable to disasters.”); Susan Milligan, The 
Forecast for Recovery, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 21, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018-09-21/hurricanes-hit-everyone-
but-the-poor-have-the-hardest-time-recovering?context=amp [https://perma.cc/WS6M-
YMPR] (“[W]hen it comes to escaping, surviving and recovering from a natural disaster, it’s 
the poor who suffer the most, experts say. . . . Cheaper houses are also less safe, without the 
strong foundations or reinforcements that can make the difference between a blown-away 
home and one with some window damage. . . . In the Carolinas, where 39 people have died 
already from Florence, the damage is disproportionately affecting the poor and will continue 
to do so during the recovery . . . .”). 
 214 Leah Platt Boustan, Maria Lucia Yanguas, Matthew Kahn & Paul W. Rhode, 
Natural Disasters by Location: Rich Leave and Poor Get Poorer, SCI. AM. (July 2, 2017), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/natural-disasters-by-location-rich-leave-
and-poor-get-poorer/ [https://perma.cc/EZE8-4G5A] (“[T]he rich move away from 
disaster-prone areas, while the poor are left behind.”); Krause & Reeves, supra note 213 
(“[M]ore affluent people can more easily relocate to safer areas, as a recent NBER 
working paper by Leah Platt Boustan, Matthew E. Kahn, Paul W. Rhode and Maria Lucia 
Yanguas shows.”). 
 215 See Krause & Reeves, supra note 213 (“In the eight counties most severely-
affected by Hurricane Harvey, only 17 percent of homeowners held flood insurance 
policies . . . .”); supra Part IV.B. 
 216 See, e.g., AON, WEATHER, CLIMATE & CATASTROPHE INSIGHT, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 
3 (2018), http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/20190122-ab-if-annual-
weather-climate-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/58ZU-P2MA] (showing an increase 
in natural catastrophe damages since 2000). 
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Consider, for example, the town of Paradise, California that was 
wiped out by the Camp Fire in 2018 and resulted in eighty-five people 
being killed.217 According to the 2010 Census, it was a small town with 
a population of approximately 26,000 people in the middle of California 
— not on the coast or some other area with particularly attractive 
geographic features.218 The average income was approximately 
$26,000.219 The mean home price in 2017 was $232,000.220 Thus, 
Paradise was not a refuge of affluent people who were attracted to a 
bucolic area due to underpriced homeowners insurance. 
The moral hazard argument is also intuitively weak because wildfires 
place people’s lives at risk. Most people would take steps to avoid being 
burned to death while sleeping if they knew how to avoid it even if their 
estates would recover insurance proceeds following their deaths. 
Consequently, some empirical studies done in America and Europe 
have proven that people who are insured against natural catastrophes 
take more, not less, precautions to avoid losses, so the moral hazard 
argument is unpersuasive in this context.221 
Nonetheless, even if one were to accept that moral hazard is a 
legitimate concern, there are numerous ways to address it. For example, 
the premium amount can be tied to whether the homeowner takes 
specific risk reduction steps, such as removing flammable materials near 
the house, and the policies can include deductibles so the homeowner 
 
 217 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 218 2010 Census Interactive Population Search, CA - Paradise Town, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://archive.vn/20140715040220/http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext
.php?fl=06:0655520 (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) [https://perma.cc/PA5E-7F3R]. 
 219 Zip 95969 (Paradise, CA), BESTPLACES, https://www.bestplaces.net/economy/zip-
code/california/paradise/95969 (last visited Sept. 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/SA7T-
S77U]. 
 220 Paradise, California, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/Paradise-
California.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G7VM-CNK8]. 
 221 See, e.g., Qihao He & Michael Faure, Regulation by Catastrophe Insurance: A 
Comparative Study, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 189, 198-99 (2018) (noting that in America, 
homeowners “who are more likely to have flood insurance and homeowners policies 
that cover wind damage, engage in more ex ante property risk reduction behavior on 
hurricane preparedness”); Paul Hudson, W.J. Wouter Botzen, Jeffrey Czajkowski & 
Heidi Kreibich, Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence 
from Germany and the United States, 93 LAND ECON. 179, 181 (2017) (“Our analysis 
found that households with flood insurance suffer larger losses than uninsured 
households due to their higher hazard level rather than due to moral hazard, which to 
the best of our knowledge has not been shown before.”); Gebhard Kirchgässner, On the 
Efficiency of a Public Insurance Monopoly: The Case of Housing Insurance in Switzerland, 
in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 221, 236-37 (Pio Baake & Rainald Borck eds., 
2007) (noting that mandatory participation in Switzerland’s insurance program 
incentivizes risk reduction). 
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will not be made completely whole in the event of a loss.222 These are 
simple ways to incentivize insureds to avoid losses. 
Indeed, property insurance policies already contain these types of 
provisions and others that are designed to address moral hazard 
concerns. Such provisions also could be included in a governmental 
insurance program. For example, homeowners policies currently 
require the homeowner to take preventative measures intended to avoid 
or minimize a loss and they cover the costs the homeowner incurs in 
doing so under the “reasonable repairs” and “property protection” 
provisions of the policies.223 Similarly, commercial property policies 
contain “sue and labor” provisions under which the insurer agrees to 
reimburse the insured for the costs associated with minimizing damage 
caused by covered perils.224  
In addition, as discussed in Part III, not only are there a number of 
risk reduction steps a homeowner can take in the context of wildfires, 
but state or local zoning laws and building codes also can address moral 
hazard concerns by precluding the development of houses in high-risk 
areas and by requiring the use of fire-resistant building materials. 
Similar laws could and should be enacted related to building structures 
in areas that are susceptible to other types of natural catastrophes, such 
as flooding and hurricane winds. 
The final argument against governmental insurance programs to 
cover natural catastrophe losses is that private markets generally are 
better than the government in allocating resources and efficiently 
 
 222 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, Outsourcing Regulation, supra note 70, at 209 
(“[I]nsurers do, in fact, commonly share losses with insureds in various ways, including 
through deductibles and copayments.”); Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther & Matthew 
W. White, Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market 
Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325, 326 (2011) (discussing the 
reduction of premium prices for risk avoidance activities in the context of 
environmental liability policies); cf. Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability 
Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1429-30 
(2013) (“The deductible for the driver’s first-party property damage coverage in the 
auto policy should control the moral hazard of insurance in these instances.”). 
 223 See, e.g., Sample Homeowners Policy, Additional Coverages, § 2.a and 
Conditions, § C.4, reprinted in CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH & ROBERT H. JERRY, II, INSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE 602, 610 (2018) (requiring homeowner to protect damaged property 
against further damage with the insurer agreeing to pay the costs incurred to do so). 
 224 E.g., John S. Clark Co. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 2d 758, 767-68 
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (“To be covered as reimbursable sue and labor expenses [under a 
commercial property policy], those expenditures must be made for the benefit of the 
insurer in mitigating or preventing a covered loss.” (quoting Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. 
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 2001))). 
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delivering products and services.225 To support this argument, one need 
only say “NFIP.” 
As discussed in Part IV.C., the NFIP is an example of a poorly 
structured and administered governmental insurance program. The 
NFIP historically has used outdated floodplain maps due to a lack of 
funds necessary to create accurate ones, so in many instances the wrong 
homes have been insured or were uninsured.226 In fact, the flood maps 
in place at the time of Hurricane Sandy were thirty years old and the 
area in New York City considered at high risk on the maps has been 
doubled since Hurricane Sandy.227 Information regarding flood risks is 
also poorly understood by homeowners. For example, most people do 
not appreciate that a house in a 100-year flood zone has more than a 
twenty-five percent chance of being flooded over the course of a thirty-
year mortgage.228 Indeed, people generally have a poor understanding 
of how likely it is that a natural catastrophe will directly impact them at 
some point in the future. Many people are poor judges of risk; they 
think natural catastrophes are problems that impact other people and 
they do not believe natural catastrophes are likely to impact them until 
one becomes imminent.229  
Consequently, the take up rate for standalone flood insurance 
nationwide (i.e., the number of homeowners who buy the insurance) is 
low — approximately six percent of homeowners.230 Even in obviously 
 
 225 See generally David Brooks, Opinion, I Was Once a Socialist. Then I Saw How It 
Worked., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2019, at A31 (“Socialist planned economies — the common 
ownership of the means of production — interfere with price and other market signals 
in a million ways. They suppress or eliminate profit motives that drive people to learn 
and improve.”). 
 226 See GAO-14-297R REPORT, supra note 190, at 37; Beth A. Dickhaus & Darrin N. 
Sacks, Recent Developments in Insurance Regulation, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 571, 
582 (2007); see also Kriesel & Landry, supra note 8, at 405-06. 
 227 LLOYD DIXON, NOREEN CLANCY, BRUCE BENDER, AARON KOFNER, DAVID MANHEIM & 
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RAND_RR328.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TW9-V4ER] [hereinafter FLOOD INSURANCE]. 
 228 See Lee & Wessel, supra note 184. 
 229 See Laura Bliss, Why You Don’t Really Care About the Next ‘Big One,’ CITYLAB (July 
21, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.citylab.com/environment/2015/07/why-you-dont-
really-care-about-the-next-big-one/398969/ [https://perma.cc/7HHJ-AQNV] (“Turns 
out most of us just aren’t that good at calculating risk, especially when it comes to huge 
natural events like earthquakes. . . . [W]e have trouble connecting emotionally to 
something scary if the odds of it happening today or tomorrow aren’t particularly high. 
So, if an earthquake, flood, tornado or hurricane isn’t immediately imminent, people 
are unlikely to act.”). 
 230 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-127, FLOOD INSURANCE: 
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT 2 (2014), 
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high-risk areas, few people voluntarily purchase standalone flood 
policies. As mentioned, in New Orleans only ten percent of the homes 
flooded by Hurricane Katrina had flood insurance even though the city 
sits below sea level and is surrounded by water.231 In the New York City 
area, a little more than fifty percent of the homes flooded had flood 
insurance even though Manhattan and Staten Island are islands and the 
Hurricane Katrina victims’ lack of flood insurance had been widely 
reported.232 These surprisingly low numbers are despite the fact that the 
premiums charged by the NFIP have been estimated to be much lower 
than what the private insurance market would charge for standalone 
flood insurance.233 And, as noted, because the policy covers only a 
single peril — flood losses — adverse selection is a problem for the 
NFIP, with almost fifty percent of the policies being sold to properties 
in high-risk areas and five coastal states accounting for the sale of two 
thirds of all NFIP policies.234  
All told, the NFIP does a poor job of fulfilling its purpose — 
reimbursing Americans for their flood losses. Although Americans have 
suffered hundreds of billions of dollars in flood losses over the past 
three decades, the NFIP has only paid about eighteen percent of the 
total amount of the losses.235 Consequently, if the primary purpose of 
selling insurance for natural catastrophes were to run a profitable 
business in the most efficient manner possible, then the case for private 
insurers selling natural catastrophe insurance instead of the 
government could be made simply by saying “NFIP.”  
Yet, when given a choice, private insurers generally refuse to cover 
natural catastrophes due to the correlated risk problem and adverse 
 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660309.pdf [https://perma.cc/S93D-EB56] (noting that 
there are currently 5.5 million NFIP policyholders); Rachel Lisotta, Comment, In over 
Our Heads: The Inefficiencies of the National Flood Insurance Program and the Institution 
of Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 511, 518 (2012) (“[A] study in 2005 
indicated ‘84 percent of residents in flood-prone areas had not purchased flood 
insurance . . . .’”); Quynh T. Pham, Note, The Future of the National Flood Insurance 
Program in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 629, 652 (2006) 
(noting that, as of 2006, “of the estimated 72 million owner-occupied structures, only 
4.7 million property-owners purchased flood insurance through the NFIP”). 
 231 See Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from 
a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1502 (2007); Scales, supra note 
22, at 15; Pham, supra note 230, at 639. 
 232 DIXON ET AL., FLOOD INSURANCE, supra note 227, at xiii. 
 233 Lee & Wessel, supra note 184. 
 234 See id. 
 235 See French, Insuring Floods, supra note 157, at 69 (“[T]hrough March 31, 2014, 
of the approximately $274 billion of flood losses caused since 1978, the NFIP has paid 
a total of $50.6 billion, or about 18%.”). 
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selection discussed in Part II.A. Thus, a market failure for those 
coverages has occurred, and the question remains whether a 
governmental insurance program can fill the void. As discussed in Part 
IV.B., the answer is “yes,” despite the fact that the NFIP suggests the 
answer is “no.” How can these inconsistent answers be reconciled? 
 Despite the numerous problems with the NFIP, all of its deficiencies 
would be eliminated if flood coverage were bundled together with 
coverages for other natural catastrophes in a single governmental 
insurance program. The adverse selection problem that arises when 
only single peril coverage is offered would disappear under a bundled 
policy because numerous perils would be covered (e.g., hurricane 
winds, flooding, landslides, wildfires, etc.). Thus, because most people 
are at risk for one or more of these perils, most people would recognize 
a need for the policy. Further, because homeowners insurance is 
effectively mandatory for most homeowners due to bank requirements 
for a mortgage, the adverse selection problem largely would be moot 
because most people would be required by their banks to buy the 
coverage.  
The program also could be actuarially sound at a reasonable cost for 
most homeowners because the purchasers of the insurance would not 
be limited to just homeowners with the highest risk. Increasing the pool 
of insureds to approximately tens of millions of homeowners with 
diverse risk profiles also would have the additional benefit of reducing 
correlated risk concerns. 
Another way of potentially getting to that same outcome without 
creating a governmental insurance program would be to allow private 
insurers to sell insurance across state lines and to change some of the 
existing tax and accounting rules discussed in Part IV.B that discourage 
the accumulation of capital by private insurers.236 Eliminating the 
prohibition against insurers selling insurance nationwide instead of 
 
 236 Pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2018), the 
regulation of the business of insurance is reserved to the states. States only have 
authority to regulate within their state borders, however, so insurance companies have 
been created to do business in specific states. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) (stating that states only have jurisdiction over 
activities that occur within their borders); Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group 
Regulation of Insurers in the United States, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 537, 543-44 (2015) 
(“Historically, many large insurance holding companies adapted to the mismatch 
between state-based insurance regulation and the national and international scope of 
their operations by incorporating individual insurance entities within multiple different 
states.”); Schwarcz & Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 110, at 1633 
(“[I]nsurance holding companies operate in numerous jurisdictions through many 
different subsidiaries . . . .”). 
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state by state potentially would address the correlated risk problem 
associated with natural catastrophes because private insurers could 
create a nationwide pool of insureds with diverse risk profiles. When an 
insurer is restricted to selling insurance only to homeowners in a single 
state, then the likelihood the insurer will have a non-diverse pool of 
insureds increases. That, in turn, creates the correlated risk problem 
associated with natural catastrophes. With those changes to the laws, 
then perhaps private insurers would agree to insure natural 
catastrophes. A more certain way to create a nationwide pool of insureds 
for natural catastrophe coverage, however, would be to create a 
nationwide governmental insurance program.  
E. Insurance for Natural Catastrophes in Other Countries 
In considering whether wildfires and other natural catastrophes 
should be covered in America by private insurers versus a governmental 
insurance program, one should consider the ways in which other 
developed countries handle insurance for natural catastrophes. 
Wildfires are not as big a problem in Europe as they are in America, so 
they generally are treated like any other type of fire claim, as opposed 
to categorized and analyzed as natural catastrophes.237 Unlike in 
America, however, other natural catastrophes that are of significant 
concern, such as flooding, earthquakes, and landslides, typically are 
covered by government-sponsored insurance programs in other 
developed countries. To illustrate this point, the natural catastrophe 
insurance programs in Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, and Switzerland are considered. 
1. Australia 
In Australia, a number of “all-hazard” contingency plans have been 
developed, complemented by a range of sub-plans developed by each 
State and Territory.238 Natural catastrophe coverage is generally 
included in both personal and commercial property insurance.239 All 
Australian insurers generally offer coverage for a variety of natural 
 
 237 In 2018, for example, wildfires caused approximately $20 billion in damages 
worldwide, with wildfires in the United States accounting for more than $18 billion of 
that total. See AON, supra note 216, at 22. 
 238 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE 
CATASTROPHES 20 (2008) [hereinafter OECD]. 
 239 Id. at 43-44. 
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catastrophes, including fire.240 Natural disaster insurance is not, 
however, compulsory and there are no fiscal or alternative incentives to 
insure against these disasters.241 The State and Territory governments, 
along with help from the Australian government, protect citizens from 
natural disasters.242 In Australia, the Disaster Recovery Funding 
Arrangements (“DRFA”) assists in providing partial reimbursement or 
advance payment243 for certain natural disaster expenditures, 
specifically covering bushfires.244 The DRFA is a joint Commonwealth-
State disaster recovery arrangement.245 Once a natural disaster has 
occurred, the State or Territory Government seeks reimbursement from 
the Australian government after computing the financial assistance 
needed, and affected individuals contact their respective State/Territory 
emergency response agency for direct assistance.246 A State is partially 
reimbursed for eligible expenditures on catastrophe relief and recovery 
 
 240 NEIL WEEKS, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF CATASTROPHES IN AUSTRALIA 4, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/33/38120102.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/8VZS-UVPE] (providing a simplified breakdown of NDRRA 
procedures). 
 241 OECD, supra note 238, at 44. 
 242 Id. at 42-43. 
 243 See AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF HOME AFFAIRS, DISASTER RECOVERY FUNDING 
ARRANGEMENTS 2018, at 2 (2018), https://www.disasterassist.gov.au/Documents/ 
Natural-Disaster-Relief-and-Recovery-Arrangements/drfa-factsheet.PDF [https://perma. 
cc/RMX3-Z4WX] [hereinafter DRFA OVERVIEW] (“Advance payments are generally only 
made in response to significant and extremely damaging natural disasters where the 
cost is likely to be greater than the state can manage in the immediate to short-term.”). 
 244 See id. The DRFA covers disaster events that occurred on or after November 1, 2018, 
whereas the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (“NDRRA”) covers disaster 
events that occurred before November 1, 2018. What is DRFA and NDRRA?, HINCHINBROOK 
SHIRE COUNCIL, https://www.hinchinbrook.qld.gov.au/community-environment/disaster-
and-emergency-information/what-is-ndrra/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/G2SJ-4ZJK]. The DRFA replaced the NDRRA in an attempt to reform 
disaster funding in Australia. See Michael Kelly, QRA Ready for Disaster Funding Reform, 
LOCAL GOV’T ASS’N QUEENSL. (July 30, 2018), https://www.lgaq.digital/web/guest/notice-
board/-/asset_publisher/AHDhMHIxBm3z/content/id/9104547 [https://perma.cc/Y2AE-
EV69]. Reforms to Australia’s disaster funding included “improved autonomy for states and 
territories in how they deliver works, the ability for local governments to use their own 
labour, plant and equipment, and the ability to allocate efficiencies realised in delivery of 
reconstruction programs to resilience and mitigation projects.” Id. 
 245 Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA), QUEENSL. RECONSTRUCTION 
AUTHORITY, https://www.qra.qld.gov.au/funding/drfa (last visited Sept. 14, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/U6HZ-TMFV]. Australia also institutes State Disaster Relief 
Arrangements (SDRAs), which are wholly state-funded programs that assists in 
alleviating “personal hardship and distress.” Id. 
 246 See OECD, supra note 238, at 43. 
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once its expenditures exceed a specific threshold.247 The amount of 
financial assistance the Australian government provides to States 
depends upon the type of assistance provided and can reach up to 
seventy-five percent of the States’ expenditures.248 Eligible 
reimbursements include grants for relief of “personal hardship and 
distress,” such as the provision of emergency food, clothing and 
accommodation, essential housing repairs, or the replacement of 
essential household goods.249 
In addition to the DFRA, Australia implements both a Australian 
Government Disaster Recovery Payment (“AGDRP”) and Disaster 
Recovery Allowance (“DRA”) to provide financial assistance to 
individuals.250 The AGDRP is a one-time payment of $1000 for eligible 
adult residents and $400 for eligible children residents of Australia who 
have been affected by a major disaster in Australia or elsewhere.251 The 
Disaster Recovery Allowance is intended to assist “employees, small 
business persons and farmers who experience a loss of income as a 
direct result of a major disaster.”252 Under the Disaster Recovery 
Allowance, the Australian government provides eligible individuals 
with up to thirteen weeks of short-term income relief.253 In light of the 
recent wildfire crisis that occurred in Australia, Australia’s approach to 
 
 247 WEEKS, supra note 240, at 6. 
 248 DRFA OVERVIEW, supra note 243, at 2-3. 
 249 WEEKS, supra note 240, at 6. 
 250 See Helen Portillo-Castro, Emergency Management and Disaster Resilience: A Quick 
Guide, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL. (July 16, 2019), https://www.aph.gov.au/About_ 
Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/Quick
_Guides/EmergencyManagementDisasterResilience#_ftn12 [https://perma.cc/J7F8-
9JUX]. Both programs are available to individuals through Australia’s Department of 
Social Services. Id. 
 251 See Disaster Recovery Payment, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T HOME AFF., 
https://www.disasterassist.gov.au/Pages/disaster-recovery-payment.aspx (last updated 
Apr. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3553-URB2]. Whether a natural disaster is considered 
“major” is determined by the Minister for Water Resources, Drought, Rural Finance, 
Natural Disaster and Emergency Management. 1.2.6.20 Australian Government Disaster 
Recovery Payment (AGDRP) – Description, Social Security Guide, AUSTL. GOV’T, 
https://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-law/1/2/6/20 (last updated July 1, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/8VLR-EXFT]. 
 252 Disaster Recovery Allowance, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T HOME AFF., 
https://www.disasterassist.gov.au/Pages/disaster-recovery-allowance.aspx (last updated 
Apr. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9PFA-J9Y8]. 
 253 Id. Payments under the Disaster Recovery Allowance vary per year and are 
determined by the Minister for Agriculture, Drought and Emergency Management. See 
1.2.6.40 Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment (AGDRP) – Description, Social 
Security Guide, AUSTL. GOV’T, https://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-
law/1/2/6/40 (last updated Mar. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6HYV-WXK5]. 
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insuring natural catastrophes undoubtedly was tested, and how it 
performed will provide lessons for America in the coming months.254 
2. Belgium 
Although the types of natural catastrophes that Belgium experiences 
is limited compared to those in other countries, it nonetheless suffers 
from some natural catastrophes — namely, storms, flooding, and 
earthquakes.255 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has 
projected that Belgium could be exposed to more significant natural 
catastrophes as a result of climate change in the future.256 
The Belgian system for insuring natural catastrophes is modeled after 
the French and Spanish natural catastrophe insurance programs.257 All 
three systems focus on risk-spreading across the country, thereby 
creating a system of solidarity among the citizens of each respective 
country.258 In Belgium, fire insurance policies that cover “simple 
risks”259 are also required to cover natural catastrophes.260 As such, 
because approximately ninety to ninety-five percent of the Belgian 
 
 254 See Jon Emont, James Glynn & David Winning, ‘If We Stayed Outside We Would Have 
Died’: Australia’s Fires Devour Farms and Forests, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2020, 4:18 PM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-we-stayed-outside-we-would-have-died-australias-fires-
devour-farms-and-forests-11578863913 [https://perma.cc/WU3X-GAQW]; Isabella Kwai, 
Apocalyptic Scenes in Australia as Fires Turn Skies Blood Red, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/31/world/australia/fires-red-skies-Mallacoota.html 
[https://perma.cc/C7EX-G3AT]. 
 255 See Véronique Bruggeman & Michael Faure, The Compensation for Victims of 
Disasters in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, 31 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
259, 268 (2019); see also OECD, supra note 238, at 48. 
 256 Bruggeman & Faure, supra note 255, at 268. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT (Rajendra K. 
Pachauri & Andy Reisinger eds., 2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/ 
uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/59G3-CMQ4] (discussing 
the future global effects of climate change). 
 257 See Youbaraj Paudel, A Comparative Study of Public — Private Catastrophe Insurance 
Systems: Lessons from Current Practices, 37 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 257, 271 (2012), 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/gpp.2012.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR2X-
TZTP]. 
 258 Id.; see also Michael Faure & Véronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-
Party Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 46 (2008). 
 259 Simple risks are “any property or collection of goods where the insurance value is not 
greater than EUR 1,445,715.” Insurance of Simple Risks Against Natural Catastrophe in 
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population has fire insurance for simple risks,261 the vast majority of the 
population is also insured for natural catastrophes. Coverage for natural 
catastrophes is divided into four types: flooding, earthquakes, overflow 
or impoundment of public sewers, and landslide or subsidence.262 
Under Belgium’s mandatory natural catastrophe coverage, insurers 
compensate victims for “all direct damage to the insured property 
caused by a natural catastrophe or by an insured peril that results 
directly from it (notably fire, explosion, or implosion) . . . .”263 Insurers 
also provide coverage for damage to the insured property that arise from 
“measures taken by a legally constituted authority to safeguard and 
protect goods and persons as well as the clearance and demolition 
expenses associated with reconstruction of the property . . . .”264 
Premium rates for mandatory natural catastrophe coverage are 
calculated based upon two separate approaches.265 Approximately fifty 
percent of insurers price the insurance based upon only the value of the 
property.266 The other half of insurers take a traditional approach of 
basing premiums upon the risk of loss presented by the individual 
properties.267 Regardless of an individual insurer’s approach, the 
maximum deductible for natural catastrophe coverage is 610 Euros per 
claim.268 
Because natural catastrophes can result in enormous damage and 
losses, each individual insurer’s risk of loss is limited.269 This limit is 
calculated based on a formula for each event and for each individual 
insurer based on the insurer’s premium income for fire coverage 
concerning simple risks.270 Once the insurer reaches the imposed limit, 
the state-sponsored National Cash Registry for Disaster Damage 
(“Disaster Fund”) covers losses above the insurer’s limit.271 The Caisse 
Nationale Des Calamites (“CNC”) administers the Disaster Fund and 
deals directly with the insurance companies; individual consumers do 
 
 261 See Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 258, at 46. 
 262 See Bruggeman & Faure, supra note 255, at 273. 
 263 Id. at 274. 
 264 Id. 
 265 See Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 258, at 46. 
 266 See id. 
 267 See id. Premiums can be based upon, inter alia, the location of the property and 
past damage to the property caused by a natural catastrophe. See id. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. 
 271 See Bruggeman & Faure, supra note 255, at 275. 
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not need to interact with the CNC.272 This type of coverage scheme 
represents a loss-sharing arrangement between the private and public 
insurance sectors. The overlapping arrangement applies only to 
catastrophic risks and does not apply to other, non-mandatory 
coverages.273 The Disaster Fund’s exposure is, however, limited.274 The 
Disaster Fund will generally cover up to 700 million Euros for 
earthquakes and up to 280 million Euros for other qualifying natural 
catastrophes per event.275 Scholars have found these upper limits 
suitable, considering that the most devastating natural catastrophes to 
hit Belgium between 1976 and 2005 ranged from 38 million to 74.7 
million Euros.276 
Although the Disaster Fund historically has adequately compensated 
victims of natural catastrophes, scholars nonetheless have criticized 
some of its shortcomings. For example, scholars have criticized the 
Disaster Fund because it imposes long wait times for financial 
compensation and presents a complex application procedure.277 
Additionally, for policyholders to receive compensation for a particular 
event, the Belgian government must label the event a natural disaster.278 
Specifically, an event must meet the following criteria: (1) the total 
damage resulting from the event must be at least 1,239,467.60 Euros, 
and (2) the average damage per family must be at least 5,577.60 
Euros.279 Notably, the Belgian system for catastrophic coverage largely 
mirrors the French system, which is discussed next. 
3. France 
France is considered a leader for natural catastrophe insurance in 
Europe.280 France’s Natural Disaster Compensation Scheme (“CAT 
NAT”) mandates comprehensive coverage for natural catastrophes 
through first-party property insurance.281 The purchase of property 
insurance is voluntary, but approximately eighty-five percent of citizens 
opt to purchase it.282 Thus, although there is no requirement to procure 
 
 272 See OECD, supra note 238, at 49. 
 273 Id. 
 274 See id. at 49-50; Bruggeman & Faure, supra note 255, at 269-70. 
 275 See Bruggeman & Faure, supra note 255, at 274. 
 276 See id. at 274-75. 
 277 See, e.g., id. at 270. 
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natural catastrophe insurance, if an individual purchases property 
insurance, then the individual receives coverage for natural 
catastrophes.283  
Policyholders, however, retain part of the risk via compulsory 
deductibles.284 These deductibles are required regardless of the terms 
and conditions of the policy.285 Deductible and premiums amounts are 
updated periodically and can vary on a sliding scale.286 The purpose of 
the sliding scale is to encourage loss prevention measures in areas that 
have not adopted loss prevention plans.287 Policyholders who live in 
municipalities that have adopted a loss prevention plan generally 
receive premium discounts.288 
Coverage for a natural catastrophe is only triggered if the French 
government considers the event a natural disaster.289 In France, a 
natural disaster is typically defined as “an accident that causes damage 
which is unusual, unavoidable, and normally not insurable.”290 
Additionally, a causal link must be established between that natural 
disaster declared and the damage suffered in order for the property to 
be covered by the policy.291 Unlike the Belgian system, which has been 
criticized for its untimely compensation,292 the French system requires 
policyholders to file a claim with their insurer within ten days of the 
French government declaring an event a natural disaster.293 Further, the 
insurer is required to make an advance payment to the insured within 
two months of the claim and must make an offer of financial 
compensation within three months of the claim being submitted.294 
In France, natural catastrophe insurance is backstopped by 
government reinsurance through Caisse Centrale de Réassurance 
 
 283 Id. at 299; see also OECD, supra note 238, at 61-62. 
 284 OECD, supra note 238, at 62. 
 285 Id. Notably, aside from premiums and deductibles, coverage for catastrophic risks 
follow the terms and conditions of the underlying policy. Id. 
 286 Id. 
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 288 See Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 258, at 44. 
 289 Bruggeman & Faure, supra note 255, at 300. France mandates coverage for 
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 290 Id. at 299; see also Michael Cannarsa, Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moréteau, France, 
in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
APPROACH 81, 86 (Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006). 
 291 OECD, supra note 238, at 62. 
 292 See supra Part IV.E.2. 
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(“CCR”).295 The law allows private insurers to transfer the risk of 
natural catastrophe losses to the CCR.296 The CCR, in turn, pays an 
annual premium to the government to obtain a governmental 
guarantee.297  
One benefit of reinsuring with the CCR is the entity’s unlimited cover 
and two different ways to reinsure with it — “quota share” and “stop-
loss.”298 Under the quota-share scheme, the primary insurer shares a 
proportion of premiums with the CCR in exchange for the CCR 
covering a share of any losses.299 Under the quota share approach, the 
CCR typically provides fifty percent of the coverage, with private 
insurers retaining fifty percent of the risk themselves.300 Under the stop-
loss approach, the CCR covers losses above a primary insurer’s retained 
risk amount. In other words, stop-loss reinsurance is only triggered if 
the total amount of the insurer’s losses exceed an agreed-upon amount, 
and the reinsurance treaties typically limit indemnity to a specific 
amount.301 On the other hand, the CCR’s stop-loss treaty with the 
 
 295 See OECD, supra note 238, at 63; Lorilee Medders, Kathleen McCullough & Verena 
Jäger, Tale of Two Regions: Natural Catastrophe Insurance and Regulation in the United States 
and the European Union, 30 J. INS. REG. 171, 184 (2011). CCR is a private reinsurance 
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1982, p. 2562; see also McAneney et al., supra note 186, at 4. 
 297 See Suzanne Vallet, Insuring the Uninsurable: The French Natural Catastrophe 
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government provides an unlimited governmental guarantee.302 The 
CCR’s premium for such coverage is a fixed amount regardless of the 
number of losses in any given year.303 
4. New Zealand 
Since the Insurance Council of New Zealand began tracking national 
catastrophes in 1968, New Zealand has been subject to over 150 natural 
catastrophes, costing citizens significant amounts of money due to the 
resulting property damage.304 New Zealand is particularly susceptible to 
storms, volcanic events, earthquakes, and landslides.305 The Earthquake 
Commission (“EQC”) is the primary source for natural catastrophe 
insurance for residential properties.306 Introduced in 1993 under the 
Earthquake Commission Act, it covers natural catastrophe losses for 
residential properties.307 It is owned by the government and it 
administers the Natural Disaster Fund.308 Residential property owners 
who voluntarily buy fire insurance from private insurance companies 
automatically get EQC coverage, with the premium added to the fire 
insurance cost.309 The policies include coverage for fires of catastrophic 
consequences that are not man-made.310 EQC coverage is compulsory 
and collected on EQC’s behalf by the fire insurer if the property owner 
insures the dwelling or its contents against fire damage.311 The EQC 
administers the natural disaster insurance, including processing claims 
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and acquiring reinsurance.312 If, however, a homeowner is unable to 
obtain coverage through a private insurer, then the homeowner may 
apply for direct coverage from the EQC.313 The EQC reviews 
applications for direct coverage on a case-by-case basis, and the 
applying homeowner must prove that it was unable to obtain coverage 
through the private market.314 If an insured procures insurance from 
the EQC, then the policyholder pays premiums directly to the EQC, as 
opposed to paying a private insurer that transfers the payment to 
EQC.315 The remainder of the program is unchanged for those that 
contract directly with the EQC.316 
The premiums paid to the EQC are not actuarially calculated.317 
Instead, the premiums are based upon a percentage of the policyholder’s 
fire insurance premium regardless of the policyholder’s risk of a natural 
catastrophe loss because it is considered too difficult and costly to 
attempt to create actuarially sound premiums regarding individual 
policyholders’ risks of natural catastrophe losses.318 For example, EQC 
premiums cost twenty cents for every NZD 100, plus the goods and 
services tax,319 of homeowners’ insurance purchased by the 
policyholder.320 After a natural catastrophe triggers EQC coverage, a 
policyholder has two years to notify the EQC of any damages from the 
peril.321 
 
 312 See Earthquake Commission Act 1993, pt 1, s 5 (N.Z.). 
 313 EQC Insurance Overview, EQC, https://www.eqc.govt.nz/what-we-do/insurance-
overview (last updated Mar. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/B67H-R875]. 
 314 See id. 
 315 Id. 
 316 See id. 
 317 See Rob Risley, Comment, Landslide Peril and Homeowners’ Insurance in 
California, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1145, 1170 (1993). 
 318 Id. at 1169-70. 
 319 See Jim Chappelow, Goods and Services Tax (GST), INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gst.asp (last updated Apr. 6, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/W9YU-CBAS] (“The goods and services tax (GST) is a value-added 
tax levied on most goods and services sold for domestic consumption. The GST is paid 
by consumers, but it is remitted to the government by the businesses selling the goods 
and services.”). 
 320 See EQC Insurance Overview, supra note 313. 
 321 EARTHQUAKE COMM’N, A GUIDE TO YOUR CLAIM WITH EQC 3 (2019), 
https://www.eqc.govt.nz/sites/public_files/documents/EQCover/A%20guide%20to%20
your%20claim%20with%20EQC%20DL-July2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRT3-DBE4]. 
The EQC, however, advises homeowners to report a claim as soon as possible for the 
EQC to most accurately assess the claim. See id. 
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5. Norway 
Each year, policyholders in Norway submit between 1000 and 1500 
claims arising from natural catastrophes.322 Most damage is due to 
flooding, but Norway also experiences landslides, avalanches, and rock 
falls.323  
Mandatory homeowners insurance covers natural catastrophes in 
Norway.324 The government establishes the aggregate limit of liability 
for insurers for any natural disaster.325 If someone who is impacted by 
a natural catastrophe does not have insurance, then a state-sponsored 
program — the National Scheme for Natural Damage Assistance (“the 
Scheme”) — covers the loss.326 Norway established the Scheme in order 
to “compensat[e] damage caused by natural perils and promot[e] the 
adoption of preventive measures against such perils.”327 The Scheme is 
not available if a loss is covered by insurance.328  
In 1980, Norway established the Norwegian Natural Perils Pool 
(“NP”).329 The purpose of the NP is to bridge the divide between the 
NP’s participants and the Scheme.330 All non-life insurance companies 
that provide fire insurance coverage in Norway are required to 
participate in the NP.331 The NP reinsures its participants for natural 
catastrophes in proportion to a participant’s contribution to the NP.332 
This contribution equates to the participant’s market share of fire 
insurance in Norway.333 Private insurers settle individual claims by the 
 
 322 See NORWEGIAN NAT. DISASTER FUND, A HISTORY OF THE NATURAL DISASTER REGIME 23 
(2011), https://www.landbruksdirektoratet.no/no/dokumenter/publikasjoner/_attachment/ 
16927?_ts=134cd12b350 [https://perma.cc/T69V-2HNW]. 
 323 Id. 
 324 See Rules of Norwegian Natural Perils Pool, 21 Dec. 1979, Act on Natural Damage 
Insurance, 16 June 1989, No. 70, § 1. 
 325 See id. § 3. 
 326 See id. § 1. 
 327 OECD, supra note 238, at 86; see also The Norwegian Natural Perils Pool, 
NORWEGIAN NAT. PERILS POOL, https://www.naturskade.no/en/the-norwegian-natural-
perils-pool/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A8GC-Q3YE]. 
 328 The Norwegian Natural Perils Pool, supra note 327. 
 329 See id.; see also OECD, supra note 238, at 87. 
 330 The Norwegian Natural Perils Pool, GREEN FIN. PLATFORM, 
https://greenfinanceplatform.org/financial-measures-database/norwegian-natural-perils-
pool (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9979-MDR9]. 
 331 OECD, supra note 238, at 87; see also The Norwegian Natural Perils Pool, supra 
note 327. As of 2008, approximately eighty insurance companies were members of the 
NP. See OECD, supra note 238, at 87. 
 332 See The Norwegian Natural Perils Pool, supra note 327. 
 333 Id. 
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terms of the relevant policy and are reinsured proportionally through 
the NP.334 Premiums for natural disasters are set by the NP and are 
based on the individual consumer’s total fire coverage.335 The consumer 
pays premiums for natural catastrophes directly to the primary insurer 
under their fire insurance policy.336 If the premiums collected by the 
insurer exceed the insurer’s pooled share of the NP, the insurer retains 
the remaining sum to use for future natural perils claims.337 
6. Spain 
In Spain, floods, earthquakes, and tsunamis are the most frequent 
natural catastrophes.338 Like the natural catastrophe coverage regime in 
France, insurance is generally optional in Spain, but some specific lines 
of insurance require mandatory extraordinary risk coverage.339 These 
lines of insurance include fire and natural events, land vehicles, railway 
vehicles, business interruption, and life.340  
Spain’s public funding for natural catastrophes operates on three basic 
principles: compensation, solidarity, and cooperation.341 The principle 
of compensation comprises compensation based on risks and 
geographic location, and it seeks to compensate constituents swiftly.342 
Like France, Spain’s natural catastrophe insurance regime also focuses 
on solidarity between citizens.343 The solidarity principle requires that 
all insureds “contribute, in proportion to their respective insured 
capital, to the endowment of a common fund available to those of the 
insured[s] who may be affected by the natural hazards covered.”344 
Lastly, the principle of cooperation encourages proper communication 
 
 334 See id. 
 335 Id. 
 336 Id. 
 337 Id. 
 338 See OECD, supra note 238, at 91. 
 339 See id. at 93. 
 340 Id. 
 341 CONSORCIO DE COMPENSACION DE SEGUROS, NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE 
COVER. A DIVERSITY OF SYSTEMS 140 (2008), https://www.consorseguros.es/web/ 
documents/10184/48069/CCS_Natural_Catastrophes_Insurance_Cover.pdf/d7cf67cc-
9591-476b-87d9-728e6a57ca60 [https://perma.cc/7NPQ-PC2G] [hereinafter NATURAL 
CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER]. 
 342 See id. 
 343 See Paudel, supra note 257, at 271; see also NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE 
COVER, supra note 341, at 140. 
 344 NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, supra note 341, at 140. 
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between the private market and public funding for the purpose of 
appropriately insuring citizens.345 
Against the backdrop of these three principles, Spain operates a state-
sponsored insurance program known as the Consorcio de Compensación 
de Seguros (“CCS”).346 The CCS is a public business organization that 
covers both natural catastrophes and unnatural catastrophes (e.g., 
terrorism).347 If an extraordinary risk is not specifically covered by 
another insurance policy or the other insurer cannot pay the claim, then 
the CCS pays the claim. In 2009, the CCS paid 541 million Euros for 
losses stemming from Storm Klaus, and in 2016, the CCS paid 120 
million Euros for flood damage.348 
The CCS collects premiums as compulsory contributions known as 
“Consorcio charges.”349 Consorcio charges are collected from private 
insurers that charge premiums on the underlying insurance policies.350 
The private insurers are able to retain a five percent collection fee for 
any collected Consorcio charges.351 The charges apply nationally and 
are fixed rates that depend upon the type of coverage.352 For example, 
the CCS will generally charge 0.08-0.09 percent per thousand insured 
for homes.353 For personal injury lines, the CCS will generally charge 
0.005 percent per thousand insured.354 The CCS places the accumulated 
funds in a stabilization reserve, and it assumes the role of insurer for the 
extraordinary risks associated with natural catastrophes. The CCS is not 
 
 345 See id. 
 346 McAneney et al., supra note 186, at 3; see also THOMAS VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 
THE BENEFITS OF INTRODUCING A MANDATORY STATE HURRICANE INSURANCE SCHEME IN 
FLORIDA 4 (2009), http://www.unil.ch/de/files/live/sites/de/files/working-papers/09.10. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/85TU-4NL2]. 
 347 See VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, supra note 346, at 4; see also OECD, supra note 238, 
at 92; McAneney et al., supra note 186, at 3. 
 348 Spain: Consorcio Charges, LLOYD’S (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.lloyds.com/ 
market-resources/tax/tax-news/2017/spain-consorcio-charges [https://perma.cc/5SKW-
RVPY]. 
 349 Id. 
 350 Id. 
 351 Paudel, supra note 257, at 266; see also Belén Soriano Clavero, The New Rate for 
Extraordinary Risks with the Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros from 01/07/2018, 
CONSORSEGUROS, http://www.consorsegurosdigital.com/en/numero-08/front-page/the-
new-rate-for-extraordinary-risks-with-the-consorcio-de-compensacion-de-seguros-
from-01-07-2018 (last visited Oct. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KN4E-4NEF]. 
 352 OECD, supra note 238, at 94. 
 353 NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, supra note 341, at 143; Clavero, supra 
note 351. 
 354 NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, supra note 341, at 143. 
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reinsured, but the program is backed by an unlimited governmental 
guarantee even though the guarantee has never been used.355 
The payment of losses by the CCS does not depend upon a declaration 
of an official disaster by the state.356 Further, coverage under the CCS is 
not determined by a minimum or maximum amount of quantitative 
damage.357 Instead, coverage is triggered whenever an event is deemed 
an “extraordinary risk.”358 Extraordinary risks include “extraordinary 
floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, atypical cyclonic 
storms and fall of meteorites.”359 Because the Spanish government need 
not determine whether an event is considered a disaster, any 
policyholder who suffers damage from an extraordinary risk may 
recover its losses, subject to any applicable exclusions.360 
7. Switzerland 
In Switzerland, the most common natural catastrophes are 
avalanches, floods, and landslides.361 Coverage for natural catastrophes 
is mandatorily included in fire insurance policies.362 Consequently, over 
ninety percent of Swiss citizens are insured for natural catastrophes.363 
This mandatory coverage includes protection against numerous natural 
catastrophes.364 Notably, however, the mandatory coverage does not 
include coverage for damage caused by earthquakes.365 The insurance 
schemes vary, however, among the twenty-six cantons in the country, 
thereby creating two main systems of coverage.366 
 
 355 OECD, supra note 238, at 92-93; see also McAneney et al., supra note 186, at 5 
(noting that the Consorcio “has a large and growing surplus and its Government 
guarantee has not been called upon”). 
 356 See NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, supra note 341, at 141; Telesetsky, 
supra note 307, at 699. 
 357 OECD, supra note 238, at 93; see also NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, 
supra note 341, at 141. 
 358 See OECD, supra note 238, at 93. 
 359 NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, supra note 341, at 141. 
 360 See id. at 141-42. 
 361 Id. at 147; see also OECD, supra note 238, at 94. 
 362 OECD, supra note 238, at 94. 
 363 See Paudel, supra note 257, at 265. 
 364 See OECD, supra note 238, at 94 (“Under Swiss federal law, the coverage of flood, 
inundation, windstorm, hail, avalanche, snow pressure, rock and stone fall, and 
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 365 Id.; see also NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, supra note 341, at 148. 
 366 See OECD, supra note 238, at 94. 
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In seven of the cantons,367 the insurance is sold by competing private 
insurance companies.368 In these cantons, private insurers thereby 
compete for consumers in an open market. Nonetheless, private 
insurers have formed the Natural Perils Pool (“the Pool”) in those 
cantons.369 The Pool operates as a typical risk-sharing model with 
participants pooling funds to cover damage arising from natural 
catastrophes.370 
In the other nineteen cantons, cantonal building insurance 
companies, which are institutions governed by public law that hold a 
monopoly in their respective cantons, sell the insurance.371 Like the 
other seven cantons, cantonal companies participate in a collective 
reinsurance pool, the Intercantonal Reinsurance Union (“IRV”),372 
thereby pooling their funds to share the risk of any losses arising out of 
natural catastrophes.373 For especially disastrous catastrophes, the IRV 
and cantonal insurers trigger the Intercantonal Community for Risks 
from Natural Elements (“IRG”).374 The IRG is another risk-sharing 
method by which each cantonal insurer contributes to the fund, which 
provides supplementary coverage for natural disasters.375 The IRG is 
triggered when a cantonal insurer exceeds its loss limit.376 Each 
insurer’s loss limit is fixed depending on the insurer’s capital.377 When 
triggered, the IRG provides supplementary coverage up to 750 million 
Swiss Francs.378 For events that require assistance from the IRG, the 
payment mechanism is typically broken into three layers.379 The IRV 
will pay the first twenty-five million Swiss Francs.380 Cantonal insurers 
 
 367 The seven cantons include Geneva, Uri, Schwyz, Ticino, Appenzell Inner Rhodes, 
Valais, and Obwalden. Id. 
 368 See id. 
 369 Id. 
 370 Id. The Pool is reinsured by the private Swiss Natural Hazard Pool (“SVV”). See 
Paudel, supra note 257, at 266. The SVV reinsures natural risks under a stop-loss 
agreement. See NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, supra note 341, at 152. 
 371 See OECD, supra note 238, at 94-95. 
 372 Like the SVV, the IRV reinsures natural risks under a stop-loss agreement. 
NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, supra note 341, at 150. 
 373 See OECD, supra note 238, at 95; see also Paudel, supra note 257, at 266. 
 374 See NATURAL CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER, supra note 341, at 150. 
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pay next 500 million Swiss Francs.381 External reinsurers pay the 
remaining 225 million Swiss Francs, with the IRV paying the premiums 
for such reinsurance.382 
Of the nineteen cantons insured through cantonal building insurers, 
only Nidwald is covered under a State guarantee.383 In Glarus, coverage 
may be provided by both private insurers and cantonal insurers.384 
Premiums are charged at a uniform rate determined by the Federal 
Office of Private Insurance.385 Deductibles for damage to homes range 
from ten to fifteen percent of the damage.386 
Additionally, cantonal insurers separately cover damage arising from 
earthquakes of at least a level VIII intensity based on the MSK intensity 
scale.387 Notably, coverage for earthquakes in Switzerland is not 
insurance or indemnification in their colloquial understandings. Rather, 
cantonal insurers contribute voluntary funds to the Schweizerischer 
Pool für Erdbebendeckung (“SPE”).388 The cantonal insurers do not pay 
additional premiums on these voluntary funds. The SPE serves the sole 
purpose of charitable coverage for policyholders who are subject to 
damage from earthquakes and would otherwise be uninsured.389 The 
SPE reinsures with the IRV and other private insurance companies.390 
The deductibles in earthquake claims are ten percent of the insured 
value, and the SPE will pay a minimum of 50,000 Swiss Francs.391 
In sum, natural catastrophes are covered by many governmental 
insurance programs throughout the developed world and some 
governmental insurance programs have been proven to work in 
America (e.g., Florida’s Citizens’ homeowners insurance program), so 
such programs are demonstrably feasible. With Americans facing 
various natural catastrophes exacerbated by climate change, such as 
wildfires in the West, tornadoes in the South, Midwest, and East, 
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hurricanes in the South and East, and flooding throughout the country, 
it may be time for America to consider following other developed 
countries’ leads by covering natural catastrophes under a governmental 
insurance program. 
CONCLUSION 
America is on fire. In recent years, due to past forestry management 
practice, climate change, and urban encroachment into wildlands, 
wildfires in the West have reached unprecedented levels of frequency 
and damage. Private insurers are fleeing the market. This wildfire crisis 
should be addressed on multiple fronts: reducing the chances of 
wildfires occurring, making homes in the paths of wildfires fire 
resistant, and filling the insurance void being created by private 
insurers’ unwillingness to insure homes in the paths of wildfires. 
To fill the insurance void, a governmental insurance program that 
covers wildfires, as well as other natural catastrophes, is an option 
whose time may have arrived. Many developed countries around the 
world cover natural catastrophes through governmental insurance 
programs. The government can raise the capital needed to cover the 
correlated risks that natural catastrophes present — both pre- and post-
loss — which private insurers contend they are unable to do when they 
attempt to justify their refusals to cover such risks. Bundling coverage 
for the various natural catastrophes (hurricanes, flooding, landslides, 
wildfires, etc.) in a property policy sponsored by the federal government 
also would eliminate the adverse selection and correlated risk concerns 
presented by standalone policies that cover only a single peril. Such a 
program also would address the underinsured and uninsured problem 
in America currently presented by natural catastrophes because most 
homeowners would be required by their banks to have such coverage. 
